Human Experimentation and Human Rights by Katz, Jay
HeinOnline -- 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 7 1993-1994
ARTICLES
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS·
JAY KATZ"
I. INTRODUCTION
A dilemma confronts physician-investigators in the conduct of research
with patient-subjects. As physicians they are dedicated to caring for their
patients, healing their pain, reducing their suffering. As investigators they are
dedicated to caring for their research, advancing knowledge for the benefit of
science and future patients. These two commitments conflict whenever an
individual physician-investigator comes face to face with an individual patient-
subject. Indeed, in this encounter between two persons, four personae confront
one another: the physician, the investigator, the patient in need of immediate
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help, and the subject who may himself be helped or who may help future
patients.
This dilemma is new to the practice of medicine, which in the past only
served patients' individual therapeutic needs. Only during the last fifty years,
subsequent to World War II, did medical research increase in magnitude
unprecedented in the millennia of medical history.l Indeed, in today's world
medical practice often encompasses both research and therapeutic aspects. The
research component of any medical intervention, however, may not serve the
individual therapeutic interests of patients. Instead, their well-being is
subordinated to the dictates of a research protocol designed to advance
knowledge for the sake of future patients.
In the aftermath of World War II the world was also confronted, as it had
never been before, with the terrible human costs which human experimentation
could entail. The revelation of the medical experiments conducted by Nazi
physicians during the war,2 and, twenty-five years later the discovery of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study conducted by Public Health Service physicians in the
United States3 before, during, and after the Nazi concentration camp
experiments had taken place, led to the realization that even medical progress
can exact an intolerable price. Both revelations, and others as well, had a
decisive impact on the promulgation of codes and regulations for the protection
I. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT TIlE BEDSIDE, 53-54 (1991).
Congress gave the [National Institutes of Health] (NIH) ... the budgetary resources to
expand on the work of the [Committee on Medical Research]. In 1945 the appropriation
to NIH was approximately $700.000. By 1955 the figure had climbed to $36 million; by
1965, $436 million; and by 1970, $1.5 billion, a sum that allowed it to award some
11,000 grants, about one-third requiring experiments on humans.
[d.
2. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
Volumes I & n, The Medical Case, U.S. Government Printing Office (1948) [hereinafter TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS]; THE NAZI DOCTORS AND TIlE NUREMBERG CODE, (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodine eds. 1992).
3. From 1932 until 1972, physicians of the U.S. Public Health Service conducted an
experiment, the so-called Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in Macon County, Alabama, involving 399
black persons afflicted with syphilis. The subjects had not been informed that they were
participating in an experiment to study the natural history of untreated syphilis. Instead, they
thought that they were under the medical care of the U.S. Public Health Service. The study was
terminated in 1972 at the recommendation of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory
Panel. For detailed accounts, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FINAL REPORT OF TIlE TuSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD Hoc ADVISORY
PANEL (1973) [hereinafter TuSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY]; JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD (1981);
and Alan Brandt who discovered evidence unavailable to the Panel which documented the
deceptions practiced by the U.S. Public Health Service physicians throughout the course of the
study. Alan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT 21-29 (Dec. 1978).
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of subjects of research. The requirements of consent4 and informed consent,S
based on principles of autonomy and self-determination,6 became central
prescriptions for the protection of subjects of research.
What transpired at Auschwitz and Tuskegee would not have led to
regulations of the human experimentation process had these events been
viewed as isolated occurrences, ascribable to causes utterly distinct from
ordinary contemporary research practices. The regulations were a response to
an appreciation that important lessons could be learned from these events of
relevance to contemporary research. They were also a response to the
realization, questioned by some,1 that reliance on the ethical conscience,
inculcated in physician-investigators during their medical education, provided
insufficient protection to the human rights of subjects of medical research.
In this article I shall argue that these newly promulgated requirements and
other safeguards-for example, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) charged
with the obligation to review and approve research proposals8-still do not
satisfactorily protect the rights of patient-subjects to inviolability of
personhood and body. In exploring this problem my ultimate intent is to
stimulate discussion on the need to provide greater protection to patient-
subjects' rights to self-determination and bodily integrity whenever they are
used as means for the ends of human progress. I shall argue that respect for
individual autonomy and for self-determination, which informed consent is
intended to safeguard, will remain hollow aspirations until the nature and
quality of the conversations between physician-investigators and patient-
subjects about participation in research are radically transformed.9 Inviting
such participation for the sake of science, society, and future patients is an
awesome request which, in a democratic society committed to respect for
human rights, requires the most punctilious attention to disclosure and consent.
Before proceeding, I should make it clear that I do not intend to discuss
research with vulnerable groups, such as children or the mentally impaired,
4. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the principle of autonomy, see infra note 66.
7. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354
(1966).
The ethical approach to experimentation in man has several components, two are more
important than the others, the first being informed consent. . .. Secondly there is the
more reliable safeguard provided by the presence of an intelligent, informed, conscien-
tious compassionate responsible investigator.
Id. at 1360 (emphasis added).
8. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
9. For a detailed discussion of the kind of conversations I envision in therapeutic settings,
see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocrOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter THE SILENT
WORLD], particularly Chapter 6, Respecting Autonomy: The Obligation for Conversation, id. at
130-164.
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who do not have the capacity to give their consent. My focus is on the many
patient-subjects who have the capacity to consent. Nor shall I say a great deal
about investigators' ethical obligations to consider carefully whether the
research project is important enough, and based on solid methodological
grounds, to warrant asking human beings to join them in their endeavors.
Clearly, consent is a necessary, but not sufficient, justification for using human
beings as subjects for research; they deserve only to be used for experimental
purposes when an important research question is in need of careful elucidation.
Finally, I also shall not address the problem of physical harm which patient-
subjects may suffer whenever they are parties to research. While some of the
subjects are inevitably harmed, I grant the point frequently made, that as a
group they may be harmed physically less, or at least not more, than are
patients with similar diseases in therapeutic settings. 1O I exclude consider-
ation of physical harm, however, for another important reason. I want to
distract attention from the prevalent and extensive debate on the permissible
limits of physical harm to subjects11 and, instead, draw attention to the
neglected and scant debate on the justifications for encroachments on subjects'
rights to decisional authority in the conduct of research. 12
10. P.V. Cardon et aI., Injuries to Research Subjects, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650-54 (1976).
See also ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL REsEARCH 39-40 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter ETHICS AND REGULATION].
11. Wilder identified as the central moral problem in human experimentation "the possibility
of subjects being injured or hurt." He went on to say that "[t]he other issues involved [such as
informed consent] are far from negligible; but I believe that if [physical injury] were not a factor,
human experimentation would not be the moral issue of the same order as it is now." Daniel
Wilder, The Central Ethical Problem in Human Experimentation and Three Solutions, 26 CLIN.
REs. 380 (1978). If Wikler is correct, then this article seeks to raise the consciousness of the
medical community and the public about the great harm done by the disrespect accorded to the
dignitary rights of subjects of research.
12. Two recently. reported experiments which received considerable press attention are
examples in point.
(1) Hepatitis B Study: During a drug trial conducted at the National Institutes of Health, five
out of fifteen participants .died some time after the administration of an experimental drug,
Fialuridine (FIAU), that had shown promise in the treatment of Hepatitis B. Lawrence L. Altman,
Fatal Drug Trial Raises Questions about 'Informed Consent', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at B7
[hereinafter Fatal Drug Trial]. The principal investigator correctly averred that "the public must
understand that 'drugs can do harm just as much as they do good,''' for despite the best intentions
and care, injuries will accompany experimental investigations as they do therapeutic interventions.
Id. at col. 4. Questions, however, were also raised about the adequacy of the informed consent
process. For example, "Dr. [Judith] Swazey [co-director of a major study of review boards and
consent forms for the National Institutes of Health] said that the term 'new medication' was
misleading. [The principal investigator] should have used the term 'experimental anti-viral
compound' on the form and underlined it." Id. at cols. 4-5. My reading of the Clinical Research
Protocol and the Informed Consent Form suggests that it adequately disclosed the risks of the
study. See Jay H. Hoofnagle, Six-Month Course ofFIAU for Chronic Hepatitis B (Feb. 10, 1993)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Research Protocol]. At the same time, and in agreement with
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More importantly, I shall argue throughout this article that the protection
of the rights of research subjects to self-determination cannot be safeguarded
until a number of underlying problems affecting the informed consent process
in decisive ways have been resolved. The underlying problems are these: (1)
The obfuscation of the distinction between therapy and research and the
Swazey but generalizing on her observation, the infonned consent fonn did not make crystal clear
that this was purely an experimental study. To be sure, if the promise of therapeutic benefit
materializes the subjects will benefit, but for now they must appreciate that, similar to other
experimental interventions, their participation could expose them to grave unknown risks. In this
instance, such a forthright acknowledgement was particularly important since in the prior pilot
study "[p]otential side effects of PIAU were seen in two patients but in both cases PIAU did not
clearly appear to playa major role." [d. at 5. The death of one of the patients in the pilot project
was ascribed to other causes and, from the vantage point of hindsight, was probably an incorrect
assessment. The death of five participants, of course, deserved investigation and from my reading
of the protocol would have established that the investigators t~k great care to avoid such a
possibility. The question, however, remains whether the patient-subject knew that they had
agreed to join the experimenters on a voyage into the unknown that c,?uld shatter their limbs or
lives. That fact should also have been highlighted, as it was not, in the infonned consent fonn.
The unfortunate and perhaps unavoidable death of five subjects thus can easily divert attention
from a crucial issue: the importance of paying the most punctilious attention to disclosure and
consent.
(2) The IL-2 Study: In another experiment, prominent cancer researchers confessed to
injecting a drug, IL-2, into "the brain tumors of dying patients to see if it would help them,"
Philip J. Hilts, Researchers Admit Study With Drugs Had No O.K., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1993,
at B5 col. 1. The drug had not been approved for such use by the FDA and the investigators had
not submitted their protocol to the hospital's Institutional Review Board (IRB). The newspaper
account does not mention whether the patient-subjects were infonned about their participation in
an experiment and the circumstances surrounding it. What particularly caught my attention in
reading the story was that "the United States Attorney's office in Manhattan investigated the case
[and decided] not to prosecute ... at least in part because no apparent harm was done to the
patients, who were near death from brain tumors." [d. Again the focus is on physical harm and
not on the harm inflicted by disrespecting the decisional authority of the patients involved. If the
investigators had discussed with their patients the investigational nature of the study and the
patients, aware of their desperate condition, had agreed, then, beyond infractions of federal
regulations, a major question that remains is when, if ever, can unapproved drugs be used with
subjects' consent? The same question has arisen in research with unapproved drugs for AIDS
patients. In my view, both they and terminally ill patients can be apprised of the status of such
drugs and such patients who are so aware of their desperate, well nigh hopeless, situation, may
then be quite willing to opt for participation. As long as they are protected from physician-
investigators' spurious promises and other deceptive exploitations of their necessitous
circumstances, there may be nothing wrong with honoring their consent. Indeed, respect for
autonomy may dictate it. Since it will give them a measure of hope-and what else is left to
them at this most agonizing time in their lives-why deprive them of such solace? The danger
of unscrupulous invitations, of course, remains but careful review of both the reasonableness of
the scientific proposal and the forthrightness of the infonned consent process can do much to
ensure that the patient-subjects know to what they are consenting.
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accompanying confusion of patients and subjects;13 (2) the impact of the
ideology of medical professionalism on the conduct of human experimenta-
tion;14 (3) the unclarity about the different tasks of medicine and research;ls
and (4) the impact on the informed consent process on the mindset of
physician-investigators and the principles that govern the invitation to
participation in research. 16 Finally, I shall suggest that the resolution of any
inevitably persisting tensions between the inviolability of person and the
acquisition of knowledge cannot be left to the discretion of physician-
investigators or local IRBs. If any encroachments on citizen-patient-subjects'
rights to self-determination prove to be necessary, it should require a
thoroughly considered and explicit congressional mandate which now does not
exist. It should also require the establishment of a national body with the
authority to formulate rules for, as well as to administer and review, the human
experimentation process. 17 A recent research project conducted with
schizophrenic patients will illustrate these contentions. 18
II. THE RESEARCH-THERAPY DISTINCTION
Physician-investigators have long maintained that clinical research and
therapy, more often than not, are indistinguishable; that the drugs or therapies
they subject to scientific study frequently are, or could be, proffered to patients
in therapeutic settings; and that the only difference between their scientific
endeavors and clinical practice resides in the objective evaluation of efficacy
and risk-benefits to which they submit their interventions. Thus, since vast
uncertainties and ignorance about effectiveness and risk-benefits are ubiquitous
in the practice of medicine, every medical intervention, therapeutic or
investigative in intent, constitutes an experiment. 19 Moreover, investigators
13. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 64-90 and. accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 102-136.
19. For example, Thomas Chalmers stated: "It is extremely hard to distinguish between
clinical research and the practice of good medicine. Because episodes of illness and individual
people are so variable, every physician is carrying out a small research project when he diagnoses
and treats a patient." Quoted in ETHICS AND REGULATION, supra note 10, at 3. While Levine is
correct that in recent years new definitions of what constitutes research have been formulated, the
obfuscation of subject and patient described in this section continue to obliterate the re-
search/therapy distinction, at least in investigators' interactions with research subjects. [d. at 3-10.
More generally, Royall documented the convictions of many investigators who continue to defend
the ethics of clinical trials on the basis of the unsatisfactory state of clinical practice:
[I]f therapy A were known to be better than B, then there would be no need for a [clinical
trial]. And if it is not known, then the physician who believes that A is better has no
sound basis for recommending A; his belief represents only a personal opinion, an
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are apt to argue that in clinical practice patients are exposed to unnecessary,
scientifically unproven, ineffective, and at times dangerous therapies about
which patients learn little because their physicians believe in the therapies and
their unwarranted beliefs are shared by many of their professional peers. In
this view, clinical research differs from practice only in its endeavors not to
perpetuate these uncertainties, but to resolve them once and for all for the
benefit of future patients and perhaps even for the patient-subjects involved in
clinical trials. Indeed, investigators maintain that clinical research is an
enterprise more moral than clinical practice because ultimately it will safeguard
patients and future patients from the slings and arrows of useless, if not
dangerous, therapies. Therefore, it is grossly unfair not to extend the
considerable discretion which doctors enjoy in making decisions on behalf of
patients in therapeutic settings to investigators, and instead subject them to
onerous review procedures regarding informed consent.
These contentions speak to the latitude physicians are given generally in
making decisions on behalf of patients, despite the requirement for informed
consent. For even in clinical practice the doctrine of informed consent
continues to be an empty ritual not only because it does not require physicians
to disclose the uncertainties inherent in their interventions, about which
investigators are so correctly concerned, but also because the doctrine remains
so inattentive to its underlying idea that patients and physicians must make
decisions jointly, with ultimate decision-making authority residing in the
patient and not in the physician.20 Yet, all these problems notwithstanding,
the doctrine of informed consent, as currently articulated, imposes similar
disclosure and consent obligations for therapy and research,21 with the only
unscientific hunch, and is not a proper basis for responsible professional judgment.
Richard M. Royall, Ethics and Statistics in Randomized Clinical Trials, 6 STAT. SCI. 51, 55
(1991). He then quotes Freund who shares these views:
[M]uch of what the surgeon assumes he knows is not based on solid scientific data, but
rather on training, experience, and reinforcement. The choice of treatment is neither more
nor less likely to be correct if made arbitrarily than if assigned randomly in the clinical
trial. The two courses of action can thus be considered ethically equivalent in terms of
patient risk.
[E]ven an opinion held with strong conviction is not a sufficient basis for ethical action;
passionate opinion does not make an incorrect opinion into a correct one.
Id.
20. For a more detailed discussion, see Jay Katz, Duty and Caring in the Age of Informed
Consent and Medical Science: Unlocking Peabody's Secret, 8 HUMANE MED. 187, 188-89 (1992)
[hereinafter Duty and Caring].
21. The most significant difference between the common law doctrine of informed consent
for therapy and the federal requirements for informed consent in research, resides in the
"therapeutic privilege exception." It permits physicians to withhold information if it would
"foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose
psychological damage to the patient." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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difference being that for research the informed consent process is subjected to
review by IRBs. In application, however, disclosure and consent are taken all
too lightly in both settings because physicians and physician-investigators do
not consider patients and patient-subjects as equal partners in the decision-
making process.
All the arguments about similarities between research and practice or
complaints about inequitable burdens overlook an issue that speaks to the
crucial importance of informed consent in research: In therapeutic encounters,
unlike research encounters, physicians are expected to attend solely to the
welfare of the individual patient before them. Throughout medical history this
expectation has given physicians considerable discretion and authority to make
decisions on behalf of patients. More recently, to be sure, such discretion and
authority have been questioned on many grounds. I shall mention only two.
First, since many of the diagnostic and therapeutic options now available allow
patients to make choices that can have a decisive impact on the quality of
future life, what a physician thinks is best may not necessarily comport with
a patient's overall needs.22 Second, because the available options may have
Courts in the past have construed the privilege not to disclose most liberally, but the Canterbury
court cautioned that it must be "carefully circumscribed ... for otherwise it might devour the
disclosure rule itself. The privilege does not accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may
remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician
feels the patient really needs." [d. at 789. In a recent case, the Court of Appeals of California
reduced the scope of the therapeutic privilege even further by requiring that in instances of
hopeless prognosis (the most common situation in which the privilege has been invoked) the
patient be provided with such information: "If not the physician's duty to disclose a terminal
illness. then whose?" Arato v. Avedon, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 181 n.l9 (1992). The California
Supreme Court reversed. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (1993). Its opinion made too much of
an issue raised by the plaintiffs which led the appellate court to hold that doctors must disclose
"numerical life expectancy information." [d. at 604. To be sure, disclosure of statistical
information is a complex issue, but in focusing on it, the supreme court's attention was diverted
from a more important new disclosure obligation promulgated by the appellate court: the duty
to inform patients of their dire prognosis. The supreme court did not comment on that obligation
and, instead, reinforced the considerable leeway granted physicians to invoke the therapeutic
privilege exception to full disclosure: "[W]e decline to intrude further, either on the subtleties
of the physician-patient relationship or in the resolution of claims that the physician's duty to
disclose was breached by requiring the disclosure of information that mayor may not be indicated
in a given treatment context," [d. at 607.
22. See THE SILENT WORLD. supra note 9. at 8.
The objectives of health and cure that supposedly unite physician and patient in a
common pursuit can rarely be fully realized. Furthermore, these objectives can be pursued
in a variety of ways, each with its own risks and benefits. The physician's personal and
professional ethics and experience may dictate one course: the patient's needs, wishes and
priorities, motivations. and expectations may indicate another one. Thus, health turns out
to be an ambiguous state about which doctors and patients may have conflicting
expectations ....
[d.
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an impact on physicians' economic rewards, physicians' self-interests can
.readily influence their professional recommendations.23
Indeed, the doctrine of informed consent was promulgated in 1957 in
response to both of these new realities.24 Judges thought that the introduction
of new powerful diagnostic and treatment modalities, which promised great
benefits but could also inflict considerable harm, required that patients be
given a greater voice in the medical decision-making process.2S Yet,
informed consent notwithstanding, the physician-patient encounter continues
to be shaped by the belief, shared by doctors and patients, that in therapeutic
settings doctors at least try to do their level best for the individual patient who
seeks their help and, therefore, the doctor's recommendations can be trusted.
In clinical research, on the other hand, patient-subjects are also being used
for the ends of science. One cannot dismiss with impunity the implications of
this difference.26 In these situations investigators are committed both to real,
present patients and abstract, future patients. Individual patient-centered
therapy gives way to a collective patient-centered endeavor in which the
23. See, e.g., Arnold S. Reiman, Dealing with Conflict of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED.
749 (1985); Broce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office
Practice-A Comparison ofSelf-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1604 (1990); Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, New Evidence ofthe Prevalence and Scope
ofPhysician Joint Ventures, 268 J.A.M.A. 80 (1992).
24. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trostees, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). At the
end of his opinion, Justice Bray introduced the doctrine of informed consent in a short, albeit
confusing, paragraph. For a detailed analysis, see THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 9, at 60-65.
25. The situation in Salgo, see supra note 24, involved the use of a new diagnostic procedure
to locate a block in the abdominal aorta. It required injection of a dye, sodium urokon. In 1954,
aortography had not been performed in sufficient numbers in the San Francisco Bay area to
constitute routine procedure. The doctors admitted that they had not disclosed to Martin Salgo
the risk of the procedure which resulted in a permanent paralysis of his lower extremities. In
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), Irma Natanson suffered severe injuries from cobalt
radiation, administered subsequent to a mastectomy for breast cancer. In 1955, cobalt radiation,
instead ofconventional x-ray treatment, had barely been introduced in Wichita, Kansas. Dr. Kline
admitted that he had not informed his patient of the hazards of cobalt radiation or the availability
of other post-operative treatment modalities. My reading of the two opinions suggests that the
justices were astounded and troubled by the undisputed facts in both cases; that, without any
disclosure, new technologies were employed which not only promised great benefits but also
could expose patients to formidable and uncontrollable risks. Natanson, unlike Salgo, discussed
the informed consent doctrine in some detail and it marked the true beginning of a new common
law doctrine.
26. Consider the views of Foster Lindley:
I did not realize that decisions . . . regarding alternative therapies, have themselves
become matters of life and death. That people die in the service of abstract, controversial,
statistical proofs, I cannot accept. That they die at the hands of physicians who
mistakenly prefer one therapy to another, I can accept. Some will see an inconsistency
there; I do not.
Royall, supra note 19, at 74.
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abstraction of the research question tends to objectify the person-patient.27
It does so to a significantly greater extent than in therapeutic interactions, even
though similar problems of objectification arise in therapeutic settings when
doctors attend too much to the disease of the body in the bed and not to the
person before them.28
The readiness with which clinical research continues to be viewed as an
extension of clinical practice, both similarly grounded in the millennia-long
Hippocratic commitment to the welfare of the individual patient, overlooks the
transformation of medical practice since the age of medical science.29
Throughout most of medical history, research was limited to careful bedside
observation of the effects of innovative treatments, with the interests of the
individual patient as a polestar. In today's world, on the other hand, the
interests of patient-subjects may yield to varying extents to the interests of
science. This revolutionary development has not been accompanied by a
thoroughgoing re-examination of physicians' ethical obligations in a post-
Hippocratic age.
Examples in point are the many cooperative clinical trials, generally
randomized clinical trials (RCTs),30 in which institutions throughout the
27. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
28. In a conversation between a senior physician and a medical intern, the former asked how
much the intern knew about "patients as human beings." The question led to a rather
nonproductive exchange which the intern ended abruptly with the exasperated comment: "I
cannot answer your questions. You're interested in patients. I'm interested in the disease in the
body in the bed." RAYMOND S. DUFF & AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY
128 (1968).
29. Medical practice has become transformed in other ways as well which should have led
to greater involvement of patients in the medical decision-making process:
Medicine's recent ascent from empiricism to science has brought forth spectacular
technologic advances in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. Today the numerous
options available for the treatment of many diseases allow patients greater choice.
Moreover, the introduction into medicine of scientific reasoning, aided by the results of
carefully conducted research, permits doctors to be more discriminating between
knowledge, ignorance and conjecture in their recommendations for or against a treatment.
For the first time in medical history, it is possible, even medically and morally
imperative, to give patients a voice in medical decision making; possible, because
knowledge and ignorance can be better specified; medically imperative, because a variety
of treatments are available, each of which can bestow benefits or inflict harm; morally
imperative, because patients, depending on the lifestyle they wish [to lead) after treatment,
must be given a choice.
Duty and Caring, supra note 20, at 189.
30. The randomized clinical trial (ReT) is generally regarded as the gold standard for the
evaluation of therapeutic agents.
The ReT has four main elements. 1) It is "controlled," i.e., one part of the subject
population receives a therapy that is being tested while another part, as similar as possible
... , receives either another therapy or no therapy.... 2) The significance of its results
is established through statistical analysis. . .. 3) When it is feasible, a double-blind
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United States participate and which are designed to evaluate the effectiveness
of various treatment modalities for breast cancer, coronary artery disease,
prostate cancer and stroke. In the conduct of such clinical trials, conflicts
between the interests of patients and science are ever-present and are all too
readily swept aside by viewing patient-subjects less as subjects and more as
patients who can only benefit from participation in such clinical trials.
Convictions of therapeutic benefit thus shape decisively the informed consent
dialogue in clinical research, aided and abetted by patients' belief that their
doctors have their interest uppermost in mind.3!
This belief is at best only partially warranted. Investigators have other
personal and professional interests which can only be kept in check if both
physician-investigators and patient-subjects fully appreciate that both are
engaged in an enterprise in which patient-subjects are also being asked to serve
as means for science's ends and that other therapeutic alternatives are often
available which do not involve a research dimension.
From all I have said so far, it follows that a major problem which
compromises the protection afforded to subjects of research resides in the
obfuscation of the boundaries between clinical research and clinical practice.
It is therefore imperative to view clinical research as a distinct category,
sharply delineated from clinical practice.32
The need for such sharp distinctions may fade once physicians no longer
exercise such sweeping authority over patients' medical fate. In The Silent
World of Doctor and Patient, I not only questioned this authority but also
argued that the doctrine of informed consent has insufficiently reduced this
authority.33 Thus, patients have not been provided with meaningful opportu-
nities to make their own choices.34 If the time ever comes when patients'
technique is employed. That is, neither the investigator nor the subject knows until the
conclusion of the study who is in the treatment or control group.... 4) It is randomized,
i.e., the therapies being compared are allocated among the subjects by chance.
Ennes AND REGULATION, supra note 10, at 185. Refs are frequently employed. "In 1975 there
were over 750 separate protocols involving over 600,000 patient-subjects. These numbers are for
NIH [National Institutes of Health] sponsored trials only; many additional Refs are conducted
or sponsored by drug companies or with funding from other sources." Id. at 186. For a complete
account of the design and conduct of Refs, see id. at 187-212.
31. Recently George J. Annas aptly noted: "Researchers tend to think that they do good, that
they don't do bad. And patients feel the same way; they tend to minimize or totally downplay
the risks." Fatal Drug Trial, supra note 12, at col. 2-3.
32. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33. See THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 9, at 85-103.
34. Alan Meisel said:
Instead of informed consent, what we usually find in the practice of medicine is what my
colleague Loren Roth has called "informed compliance." Doctors make decisions about
the treatment patients should have, and then they provide whatever information is
necessary to get the patient to go along with the recommendation. Patients are not given
information to facilitate their decision-making process. That patients "make" decisions
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rights to autonomy and self-determination are truly respected, the problem to
which I now turn-the impact of the ideology 'of medical professionalism on
clinical research-will be less pressing. It is this ideology which has given,
and continues to give, physicians considerable latitude to decide for patients,
in the belief that doctors can be trusted because their self-interest will yield to
patients' interests. While I have already suggested that this is a questionable
assumption for therapeutic settings, it surely is an untenable one for clinical
research where physician-investigators have dual allegiances-to their patient-
subjects and the research protocol.
III. THE IDEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM
The presumption of physician authority over the medical needs of their
patients has been the bedrock of the ideology of professionalism. Throughout
history, physicians have maintained that patients' needs are best served by
following doctors' orders. As stated by the influential sociologist Talcott
Parsons: "[The physician's] competence and specific judgments and measure
cannot be competently judged by the layman. The latter must ... take these
judgments and measures on 'authority.' . .. The doctor-patient relationship
has to be one involving an element of authority-we often speak of 'doctor's
orders. ",35 Physicians' insistence on complete authority over the needs of
patients has been compellingly supported by another claim: that patients are
incapable of understanding medicine's esoteric knowledge. As stated by
Howard Becker:
Professions ... are occupations which possess a monopoly of some esoteric
and difficult body of knowledge. [This knowledge] consists not of technical
skills and the fruits of pmctical experience but, rather, of abstract principles
arrived at by scientific research and logical analysis. This knowledge cannot
be applied routinely but must be applied wisely and judiciously to each
case.36
Most physician-investigators were first socialized as physicians and
indoctrinated in the ideology of professionalism. While, 'in theory, it has
yielded ground to the doctrine of informed consent, in practice, the impact of
that ideology has, at best, only diminished. It is, therefore, not surprising that
investigators continue to point to the esoteric knowledge problem. In addition,
investigators maintain that this problem is compounded in clinical research
is a myth, at least as much (if not more) because they are not given an adequate
opportunity to do so as because they are inherently unable to do so.
Alan Meisel, Comments to T.M. Grundner. More on Making Consent Forms More Readable, 4
IRB 9 (Ian. 1982).
35. TALCOTI PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 464, 465 (1954).
36. Howard Becker, The Nature ofa Profession, in EXPERIMENTAnON WITH HUMAN BEINGS
186-189 (1993).
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because patient-subjects are even less capable of understanding the additional
medical and scientific complexities Which a clinical trial seeks to resolve.
Thus, they argue that patient-subjects' consent, given on the basis of such
disclosures, would be even more spurious than it is for therapy. Moreover,
since they view subjects of research as patients, they also argue that full
disclosure would do violence to the principle of beneficence,3? which stresses
the caring obligations of doctors toward their patients. Disclosure, they say,
would reveal that customary treatments to which patients would be exposed if
they were to decline to become subjects are beset by much uncertainty as to
which treatment is best, effective, or harmful. All this can only make patients
unduly frightened, cause them to lose hope in what medicine has to offer, and
strip them of trust in their physicians.
For all these reasons, the argument goes, any respect for patient autonomy
must be balanced against the principle of beneficence, of caring for the
suffering patient who happens to be also a subject of research. In countless
conversations with physician-investigators, I have heard paternalism and
beneficence, and not respect for autonomy, defended as guiding principles for
the conduct of research.
Thus, under the ideology of professionalism the autonomy of physicians
is maintained at the expense of patients' autonomy. I have long believed that
this ancient ideology no longer serves patients'· interests well in an age of
medical science and informed consent. Surely it cannot be transported into the
research setting, where it is joined by the ideology of medical science, with its
commitment to objectivity and search for ultimate answers that will benefit
mankind. Such an unwarranted alliance has fateful consequences to persons
who are not merely patients but also subjects.
37. For an extensive discussion of the principle of beneficence. see TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL Enncs 148-182 (2d ed. 1983).
Morality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously and that we refrain from
harming them. but also that we contribute to their welfare. including their health . . ..
In its most general fonn. the principle of beneficence asserts the duty to help others
further their important and legitimate interests. The duty to confer benefits and actively
to prevent and remove hanns is important in biomedical and behavioral contexts. but
equally important is the duty to balance possible goods against the possible hanns of an
action.
[d. at 148-49.
Note that "the duty to balance" may require giving greater weight to beneficence than
autonomy. While this may be necessary with incompetent patients and research subjects. such
balancing is often carried on in interactions with competent patients and research subjects. This
then leads to withholding crucial information from patients in order not "to distress" them. While
even in therapeutic encounters with competent persons such "balancing" is questionable. it is
inappropriate to balance possible goods against hanns in the conduct of clinical research.
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The legal doctrine of informed consent has had little impact on moderating
physician authority.38 This is not surprising since the doctrine's underlying
assumption, that patient autonomy deserves respect, has been foreign to
physicians' thinking throughout medical history,39 Though it is true that
patients now receive more information about the risks and benefits of the
recommended intervention than they did in earlier times, this change also
obscures how little has changed. For such disclosures notwithstanding, the
decision-making process continues to be under physician control.
Thus, the consequences of importing the ideology of medical professional-
ism into research settings are far~reaching. It permits, as I have already noted,
viewing subjects as if they were patients. It permits physician-investigators to
extend the invitation to participate in research with the same authority to which
they have become accustomed as a result of their prior socialization as
physicians. It permits not fully informing patient.;;subjects about uncertainties
and risks inherent in clinical research on grounds of beneficence which
physicians traditionally invoke for clinical practice. Any of these reasons,
however questionable in therapeutic settings, are unwarranted justifications for
non-disclosure in the context of research.
IV. RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY AND BODILY INVIOLABILITY
Twenty years ago, in the Introduction to my book Experimentation with
Human Beings, I wrote:
When human beings become the subjects of experimentation. . . tensions arise
between two values basic to Western society: freedom of scientific inquiry and
protection of individual inviolability.... At the heart of this [value] conflict
38. See the perceptive comments by Alan J. Weisbard on informed consent:
[I]n its attempt to translate the moral ideal of informed consent into a set of workable
legal rules adapted to the t~hnical requirements of the litigation process, the law has
transformed that ideal into little more than a legal "duty to warn" of risks of medical
treatment. This duty is measured not by the actual informational needs of the individual
patient, but by the hypothetical needs of "reasonable patients" or by the prevailing norms
of disclosure of the medicBl community. While purporting to assure respect for individual
self-determination, the inaptly named law of informed consent has done little to "inform"
the unique and sometimes idiosyncratic needs, concerns, and fears of individual patients
on whose "consent" so much is said to rest. Indeed, one can plausibly maintain that the
legal doctrine has done more to teach physicians how to practice medicine "defensively"
(so as to minimize legal liability) than it has to foster physician-patient relationships that
permit and encourage patients to participate actively and knowledgeably in decisions
concerning their care.
Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65
NEB. L. REv. 749, 751 (1986).
39. See THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 9, at 1-29. '''The idea that patients may also be
entitled to liberty, to sharing the burdens of decision with their doctors, was not [at least until
recently] part of the ethos of medicine," Id. at 2.
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lies an age-old question: When may a society, actively or by acquiescence,
expose some of its members to harm in order to seek benefits for them, for
others, or for society as a whole-ro
My question assumed, at least implicitly, both the necessity of conducting
human research and the inevitability of harm; it asked only when may society
"expose some of its members to harm." I did not ask then as I shall do now:
When, if ever, can it be justified to use human beings as means for the ends
of others?
In now raising the question of justification, I do not wish to deny the
morality of human experimentation. Ultimately it is necessary to conduct
human trials in order to acquire the necessary knowledge to alleviate human
suffering. I wish only to call attention to the fact that investigators' oft-
invoked moral right to engage in human experimentation has left insufficiently
considered the morality ·of how the invitation to participation in research must
be extended so that the rights of subjects to be secure in their person and body
remain sacrosanct.
Sir Isaiah Berlin addressed this fundamental issue in a different context
when he asked: "In the name of what can [we] ever be justified in forcing
men to do what they have not willed or consented to?,o41 His eloquent
answer was this:
[T]o manipulate [men], to propel them towards goals which [we] see, but they
may not, is to deny their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills
of their own, and therefore to degrade them. This is why to lie to men, or to
deceive them, that is, to use them as means for [our], not their own,
independently conceived ends, even if it is to their own benefit, is, in effect,
to treat them as subhuman, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and
sacred than [our] own. '" For if the essence of men is that they are
autonomous beings-authors of values, of ends in themselves ...-then
nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous but natural
objects ... whose choices can be manipulated ....42
Sir Isaiah speaks here to the importance of safeguarding the principle of
autonomy. But in addition to this liberty interest, another human interest must
be considered: the right to bodily integrity. John Locke encompassed both
rights when he wrote that "every Man has Property in his own Person. This
no Body has any Right to but himself."43
The United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
in Article 7 juxtaposes the rights to autonomy and bodily integrity: "No one
40. JAY KATZ, ExPERIMENTATION wrrn HUMAN BEINGS 1(1972) [hereinafter ExPERIMENTA-
TION WITH HUMAN BEINGS].
41. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR esSAYS ON LmERTY 136-37 (1969).
42. [d.
43. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 305 (peter Laslett ed., 1960).
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shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation.,,44 For years, I was puzzled by the
inclusion of experimentation and torture within the same Article rather than
giving each separate status as the Covenant does for the other rights it seeks
to safeguard. I now see the connection. The drafters of the Covenant
probably wished to convey that human experimentation "without his [or her]
free consent" constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment akin to "torture,"
no matter what the motives of the investigator.4s In the Western world we
place a high value not only on autonomy but also on the inviolability of bodily
integrity. Both make any unconsented invasions of subjects' bodies repugnant
even if the physical risks are minimal.
Some commentators have suggested that too much is made of respect for
autonomy in human research. While I do not share their views, I now want
to add respect for bodily integrity, which is highly valued in our American
jurisprudence,46 as another reason for safeguarding citizens' rights to feel
secure in their bodies. Since physicians have been given considerable
discretion to inspect, touch and invade patients' bodies, it is easy to overlook
that this privilege cannot be extended to research without a prior relentless
44. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. art. 7 (1966), in nm
HUMAN RIGHTS READER (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1979).
45. It could be argued that the juxtaposition of "scientific experimentation" and "torture" was
solely a response to the sadistic ways in which the concentration camp research was carried out
and, therefore, a prohibition only of such egregious conduct. If true, then I wish to broaden the
implications of Article 7.
46. The United States Supreme Court first articulated the right to bodily integrity over a
century ago, explicitly noting that such a right is fundamental to the common law: "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250 (1891) (refusing to order a plaintiff in a tort action to submit to a surgical
examination). Since then, the Court has found a Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity in
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (refusing to order a criminal suspect to
undergo surgery to remove a bullet). Although this right is not absolute, the Court has stressed
the importance of bodily integrity in strongly worded opinions: "Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach contents ... [, these] are methods too close to the rack and the screw
to permit of constitutional differentiation." Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 171
(1952). More recently Justice Stevens in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840
(1991), citing Rochin, declared: "One aspect of [a woman's constitutional interest in liberty] is
a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's person." See also FRANCIS HILLIARD, I nm
LAW OF TORTS 197 (2d ed. 1861) (''The plainest and simplest legal rights are those of the person.
A man owns his body and limbs more unquestionably and unqualifiedly than his stock in trade
or his farm. [One's body] belong[s] absolutely to the individual, and to him alone."). Id.
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scrutiny about whether any State interest can be so compelling to override
constitutional safeguards to both autonomy and bodily integrity.
,Sir Isaiah's haunting question, raised in a different context, requires
answers: Can manipulation of subjects,of research, propelling them towards
goals which we see but they may not, be justified in the name of medicine,
science, and/or the State? I would answer: Not easily and, if at all, only
under carefully circumscribed circumstances. The reasons for my answer are
intertwined. First, it is difficult to defend the proposition that we can use
human beings as means for others' ends, without their unequivocal consent
unless authorized by a clear societal mandate, subsequent to a searching public
debate; and second, medical research is bY-and-large conducted with patients
and by physicians under the aegis of medicine and physicians' primary
Hippocratic commitment to the welfare of the individual. This commitment
becoQ1es tainted when, without a patient-subject's full knowledge, we allow the
interests of science and society to intrude on the physician-patient relationship.
The historian Mario Biagioli in his essay on the Nazi concentration camp
experiments pleaded that we need "to understand how [medical] science
became (and could again become) implicated in [such a] tragedy.'047 It did
become implicated because the contributions which science in its own right
makes to the objectification of human beings, i.e., th'e transformation of
persons into objects and data, was reinforced by the political ideology of the
Nazi State, which totally objectified Jews and Gypsies by considering them
"lives not worth living.'048 This unholy alliance led to the atrocities and
sadism perpetuated against the subjects of research for the sake of medical
science never before or since seen in the Western World. Yet, it would be a
mistake to view the concentration camp experiments merely as a singular
aberration rather than as an event which has much to teach us about research
practices in the contemporary world. In Nazi Germany the State decreed that
some "lives [are] not worth living,"49 and medical scientists then seized the
opportunity to pursue research in atrocious ways. While it is true that only
with the active collaboration of the State can science produce an Auschwitz
and Dachau, it is equally true that in contemporary research the claims of
science invite aless perceptible, but nonetheless troublesome, disrespect for the
person. Unless the greatest care is taken, medical science and physician-
investigators are always trapped into making tragic choices for the sake of
science and at the expense of the human beings who serve as subjects of,
47. Mario Biagioli, Science, Modernity, and the 'Final Solutio",' in PROBING TIlE LIMITS OF
REpRESENTATION (Saul Friedlander ed., 1992). '
48. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
49. The idea that "lives not worth living" deserve to be eliminated gained wide currency in
medicine during the 19th century. The debate focused on the merits of destroying the insane to
relieve society of a terrible burden. For a detailed account, see ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL
HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER TIlE NAZIS 177-222 (1988).
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research. This is the eternal lesson to be learned from Auschwitz.
Respect for the person is the only counterweight to such tragedies. The
judges at Nuremberg who passed judgment on the Nazi physicians recognized
this and in uncompromising language spoke to the inviolability of research
subjects. The Tribunal's first principle for the conduct of research-"the
voluntary consent of the human subject [of research] is absolutely essen-
tial"~°-eschewed any consideration of competing claims. This principle,
soon after its promulgation, was attacked as being too visionary and too
inhospitable to the advancement of science.~1 New codes and regulations for
the conduct of research were then enacted which attempted to balance the
claims of science and the inviolability of research subjects.~2 Balancing,
however, necessitates discretion, and discretion invites physician-investigators
to make tragic choices about future versus present lives.
The U.S. federal regulations on informed consent in research,~3 while
protecting the rights of subjects better than had been the case in the past, do
not go far enough in emphasizing the centrality of the inviolability of the
human rights of research subjects, if not as an ethical obligation than surely as
a societal obligation in a democracy. The drafters of the federal regulations
needed to consider that their promulgations would confer on physicians a
societal mandate to engage in clinical research and to use individuals for the
good of society, a mandate not envisioned by the Hippocratic commandment
to "use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment."S4
A mandate to conduct research, on the other hand, is different in intent and
implication and, therefore, the regulations on informed consent should have
been formulated in a way that place considerable restrictions on the use of
patient-subjects. To safeguard their autonomy would have required paying the
most careful attention not only to the criteria for informed consent but also to
the process of obtaining informed consent.
The drafters of the federal regulations should have explicitly insisted that
taking informed consent seriously in research negotiations obligates physician-
50. TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 2, at 181.
51. The critics were, of course, correct in pointing to the Nuremberg Code's lack of
provisions for conducting research with children, the mentally disabled, and perhaps even with
prisoners. Special provisions must be drafted for such vulnerable populations, and the extent of
their participation in research should be precisely specified. The Code was limited, as are largely
my comments throughout this article, to research with persons who have the capacity to consent.
52. See Human Experimentation, Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association,
Declaration of Helsinki, 2 BRIT. MED. 1. 177 (1964). For a discussion of this Declaration, see
lay Katz, The Consent Principle ofthe Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in THE
NAZI DocroRS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 227-39. There I argued that in the
Declaration of Helsinki, in contrast to the Nuremberg Code, "concerns over the advancement of
science began to overshadow concerns over the integrity of person." Id. at 234.
53. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1983) (providing for protection of human subjects).
54. HIPPOCRATES, I HIPPOCRATES 299-301 (W.H.S.lones trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1972).
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investigators to spend considerable time with prospective patient-subjects.
They should have provided explicit instructions on the length to which
investigators must go in explaining themselves and their intentions so that
patient-subjects will not be misled. Respect for the subjects' human rights
dictates that they know that the decision to participate in research entails
making a gift for the sake of others.
The drafters of the federal regulations insufficiently cautioned physician-
investigators against viewing clinical research as an extension of clinical
practice. In not construing it more emphatically as a novel and distinctly
separate activity, they contributed to importing the ideology of medical
professionalism into the conduct of research.
Before promulgating the federal regulations, great pains should have been
taken to alert Congress and the public that any societal mandate to conduct
clinical research had to be sharply distinguished from the earlier societal
mandate to superintend the health needs of citizen-patients, which was
delegated to physicians at the turn of the 20th century.55 That mandate
cannot easily be transferred to medical research settings. At a minimum, it
required a prior careful scrutiny and public debate about the limits to be
imposed on the prerogatives of investigators to use human beings for
scientists' and society's sake. Such a debate needed to be carried on with the
same intensity as the one that has repeatedly taken place on the question as to
whether it is preferable to rely on a military draft or a volunteer army to
protect citizens' and society's interests.
V. THE TASK OF CLINICAL REsEARCH
The tasks of clinical practice and clinical research are different. Robert
Levine has persuasively argued that the objectives of investigators and
practitioners are not the same:
The goal ofresearch-the development ofgeneralized knowledge-is advanced
by working according to a detailed [relatively inflexible] protocol. . " [Thus]
an appropriate question might be: "What is the antihypertensive effect of
administration of this thiazide diuretic in a specified dose range for six weeks
to patients with moderately severe hypertension?" In medical practice a more
appropriate question is: "What is the best way to control the [blood pressure]
of this patient who not only has moderately severe hypertension but also has
diabetes, congestive heart failure, and recently lost her job?"s6
. From this, Levine, on another occasion, drew a crucial conclusion:
[T]he individualized dosage adjustments and changes in therapeutic modalities
are less likely to occur in the context of a clinical trial than they are in the
55. See THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 9, at 39-42.
56. Robert J. Levine, Informed Consent in Research and Practice: Similarities and
Differences, 143 AMA ARCHNES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1229, 1231 (1982).
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practice of medicine. This deprivation of the experimentation ordinarily done
to enhance the well-being of a patient is one of the burdens imposed on the
patient-subject in a clinical trial.57
In another article, Levine perceptively described an imaginary dialogue
between a patient-subject and a physician-investigator about participation in a
randomized, placebo controlled study on the effectiveness of a new antihyper-
tensive agent:
Do you mean to say you are asking me to spend six months taking either an
inert substance or one that you have no cause to suspect is either better or
worse than that inert substance when the risk of taking a placebo entails
approximately a 28 percent chance per year of having a severe complication
such as stroke, malignant hypertension, heart failure, or death? You offer me
an invitation to participate in such an ReT when I could instead take any of
the many antihypertensive drugs which are already approved by the FDA and
which would reduce my risk of a major complication to 1.6 percent per year?
Why would any rational person do that?58
Levine concluded "Why, indeed!"59 It is difficult to believe that many
patients will consent to participation in such a study if adequately informed
about risks and alternatives. Levine's dialogue also highlights the formidable
task which physician-investigators would face if they were to explain
forthrightly to their patient-subjects what is currently known about the
effectiveness of antihypertensive drugs; or if they were to alert patient-subjects
in a placebo-controlled study that the purpose of the active agent is to mitigate
aspects of the disease process that can lead to lethal or disabling complication
and that the placebo will not protect them from such consequences; or if they
were to alert patient-subjects that preliminary evidence in studies of the
effectiveness of two different therapeutic agents has already accumulated on
the superiority of one of the agents over the other in the treatment of disease.
Research is not entirely a voyage into the utterly unknown. When a
clinical trial is contemplated, considerable information, though not yet
scientifically validated, is generally available to suggest that experimental
treatments may promise to be beneficial. Thus, in situations in which the
experimental treatment is compared with existing standard therapy, all kinds
of known or conjectured evidence has accumulated about their respective
merits. Patient-subjects generally remain ignorant of most, if not all, of these
complexities of knowledge and ignorance.60 Instead, patient-subjects are told
57. ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 10.




Quite commonly at the time a randomized clinical trial is begun, the investigators have
available quite a bit of evidence about the agents to be tested. In the United States, for
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that it is not yet known which treatment is best, but as Schafer observed, "this
statement is misleading at best, deceptive at worst.,,61 Very few patients are
aware that by the phrase "scientifically validated knowledge" the physician-
investigator only means "confirmed by a controlled trial.,,62 Such statements
conceal information from patient-subjects about alternative treatments whose
effectiveness does not rise to a ninety-five percent level of confidence or that
are based on clinical experiences or on more poorly designed earlier trials. All
this suggests that informed consent does not just involve presenting scientific
information to patient-subjects, but requires physician-investigators to translate
that information into language relevant to subjects' life experiences and
interests.
Investigators with whom I have talked confirm Schafer's observation.
They admit that they know many things about risks and benefits, but they also
insist that this information need not be communicated because they really do
not know and will only know the true scientific state of affairs at the end of
a rigorously conducted scientific study. Thus, to tell patients precious little is
ethically justified. Moreover, even those who in principle are committed to
obtaining their patient-subjects' consent will also admit that, in practice, their
invitation to participation is affected by the belief that they have already
carefully considered the project-its risks and benefits-and concluded that no
undue physical harm will come to the subjects and, therefore, they can take
some license with the informed consent process. In such conversations an old
conviction ultimately surfaces; that subjects are better protected by the
investigator being the "guarantor of [their] rights and safety,,63 than by their
own consent which rarely is a "valid" one. Thus, in reality, the idea that the
investigator is best situated to protect subjects of research continues to have
a significant impact on the minds of investigators and the ways they extend
their invitations.
VI. THE NATURE OF THE INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS IN CLINICAL
REsEARCH
If the tensions between the inviolability of research subjects and the
advancement of knowledge are to be resolved in favor of respect for the
example, the results of extensive experience with new drugs obtained during clinical
investigations or in medical practice in other countries are often available.
Robert J. Levine, The Use of Placebos in Randcmized Clinical Trials, 7 IRB 112 (Mar.-Apr.
1985). Similar information is also available in clinical research studies other than randomized
clinical trials.
61. Arthur Schafer, The Randomized Clinical Trial: For Whose Benefit?, 7 IRB 4, 5 (Mar.-
Apr. 1985).
62. Id.
63. G. Long et aI., Measurement of Anti-Arrhythmic Potency of Drugs in Man: Effects of
Dehydrobenzperidal, 28 ANESTHESIOLOGY 318-19 (1967).
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human rights of the subjects, the mindset which investigators bring to the
invitation of participation, the ethical principles which govern the invitation,
and the conversations which physician-investigators and patient-subjects must
engage in require re-examination. I shall take up each in tum.
A. The Mindset of Physician-Investigators
Physician-investigators, before approaching a potential patient-subject, must
first rid themselves of the customary attitudes which in the past shaped, if not
determined, their invitation to patient-subjects.64 A morally valid consent in
research settings requires a radically new personal and professional commit-
ment to the patient-subjects and the informed consent process: Physician-
investigators must see themselves as scientists only and not as doctors. In
conflating clinical trials and therapy, as well as patients and subjects, as if both
were one and the same, physician-investigators unwittingly become double
agents with conflicting loyalties. Only if they first know who they truly are
can they begin to make the subject understand the burdens he or she is
assuming when an invitation to participate in clinical trials is extended.
64. In The Silent World I drew attention to the "irrational and unconscious expectations
[which] influence physicians' conduct." I noted that "[e]arly in his explorations, Freud recognized
that doctors' unconscious has an impact on their relations with patients, and [that] he gave these
manifestations the name 'countertransference.'" THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 9, at 147. I then
argued that
[a] broader definition of countertransference that encompasses not only physicians'
personal conduct but also their deeply ingrained professional attitudes toward patients will
move to center stage a re-examination of the impact on physician-patient interactions of
a great many unquestioned professional attitudes. These attitudes include the need to
appear authoritative, the importance of hiding uncertainties from patients, the need to view
patients as incompetent to patticipate in decision making, and the belief that patients'
welfare depends on patients' trusting doctors' capacities to know what is in patients' best
interests.
. . . My broader view of countertransference suggests that not only physicians'
personal beliefs but also their professional beliefs are influenced by irrational and
unconscious factors. Indeed, the most pernicious countertransference problem may tum
out to be that in their professional interactions with patients, physicians view themselves
as too rational and their patients as too irrational. A more realistic view of the balance
between rationality and irrationality in both patties will itself improve decision making
between physicians and patients. The projection of irrationalities originating within
physicians onto patients is indeed one of the most pervasive and fateful countertransfer-
ence reactions.
[d. at 149, 150.
I should mention, as I made clear in my book, that by "irrational" I only meant "not subjected
. to careful conscious reflection." Thus, in the con~xt of this atticle I wanted to flag the
unexamined countertransference reactions of investigators that are grounded in their commitment
to advance knowledge but without sufficient ",flection of the impact of these motives on the
human rights of subjects of research.
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Moreover, since loyalty to the' research protocol will take precedence over
faithfulness to the therapeutic mission, and since physician-investigators will
tend to view the person before them as a patient and not as a subject, the
tragic fact that human beings are used for the ends of others can readily
become obliterated. It is then not surprising that physician-investigators,
without fully knowing it, become confused about the nature of their task, as
well as about their perceptions of themselves and their patient-subjects.
The investigators who appear before patient-subjects as physicians in white
coats create confusion. Patients come to hospitals with the trusting expectation
that their doctors will care for them.65 They will view an invitation to
participate in research as a professional recommendation that is intended to
serve their individual treatment interests. It is that belief, that trust, which
physician-investigators must vigorously challenge so that patient-subjects
appreciate that in research, unlike therapy, the research· question comes first.
This takes time and is difficult to convey. It can be conveyed to patient-
subjects only if physician-investigators are willing to challenge the
misperceptions that many patients bring to the invitation.
B. The Primacy of Autonomy
Physician-investigators must extend the invitation to participation in
research with a thoroughgoing commitment to the principle of autonomy.66
65. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
66. In their authoritative book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress
define the concept of autonomy thusly: "Autonomy is a form of personal liberty of action where
the individual determines his or her own course of action iii accordance with a plan chosen by
himself or herself.... A person's autonomy is his or her independence, self-reliance, and self-
contained ability to decide." TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 56 (1st e"d. 1979). Beauchamp and Childress continue:
It is one thing to be autonomous and to apprehend that others are acting autonomously,
but quite another to be respected as an autonomous agent and to respect the autonomy of
others. To respect autonomous agents is to recognize with due appreciation their own
considered value judgments and outlooks even when it is believed that their judgments
are mistaken. To respect them in this way is to acknowledge their right to their own
views and the permissibility of their actions based on such beliefs. And to grant them this
right is to say that they are entitled to such autonomous determination without limitations
on their liberty being imposed by others.
[d. at 58. For purposes of this article I accept their formulation of autonomy. In The Silent
World I offered a view of autonomy which is also based on psychoanalytic considerations but
which does not disagree with their views on the respect to be accorded to autonomous choices:
Respect for psychological autonomy requires that both parties pay caring attention to their
capacities and incapacities for self-determination by supporting and enhancing their real,
though precarious, endowment for reflective thought. In conversation with one another,
patients may uncover mistaken notions [and] physicians may uncover [some of] their
unconscious preferences and biases. .... Without conversation, individual self-determina-
tion can become compromised by condemning physicians and patients to the isolation of
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Edmund Pellegrino, in a recent article on the "Ethical Dilemmas in Clinical
Research," explored the moral dilemmas faced by clinical investigators. He
located them in the inevitable conflict among three values: "for science, it is
truth; for medicine, it is beneficence toward the patient; and for the investiga-
tor as an individual, it is self-interest."67 He concluded that
[t]he safe rule in [clinical research] is to favor beneficence over scientific rigor
when the two seem to be in conflict or when in doubt. The possible loss of
knowledge cannot outweigh the possibility of harm to the subject even if the
utilitarian calculus indicates great benefit to many and harm to only a few.68
He granted the scientist, however, "a certain latitude or 'discretionary space'
in the pursuit of knowledge" which is difficult to define by rules and which
"must be narrowly defined. Respect for persons and the imperative of
beneficence take precedence over scientific curiosity."69 Yet earlier he
seemed to extend the discretionary space when he expressed the hope "that the
investigator will judiciously balance the patient's interests and those of the
scientific protocol."70
Pellegrino can be understood or misunderstood as giving considerable
latitude to investigators, and for two reasons. First, he often moves from
research with competent subjects to research with incompetent subjects without
explicitly stating that entirely different considerations apply to both groups.71
solitary decision making, which can only contribute to abandoning patients prematurely
to an ill-considered fate.
'filE SILENT WORLD. supra note 9, at 128. Moreover:
Even though choices are influenced by psychological considerations, it is one thing to
appreciate that fact and quite another to interfere with choice on the basis of speculations,
or even evidence, about underlying psychological reasons. . .. Short of substantial
evidence of incompetence, choices deserve to be honored.
Id. at 112-13.
67. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Beneficence, Scientific Autonomy, and Self-Interest: Ethical
Dilemmas in Clinical Research, GEO. MED. 21 (1991).
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Similarly, the celebrated Belmont Report on principles and guidelines for human research
is confusing by not making clear distinctions between the principles that should govern research
with competent and incompetent persons. It considered three basic principles to be "particularly
relevant to the ethics of research . . .: respect for persons, beneficence and justice." 'filE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR TIlE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBmcrs OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES PuB. No. (OS)
78-0012, 'filE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRiNCIPLES AND GUiDELINES FOR TIlE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBmcrs OF RESEARCH 4 (1978). The report continues:
1. Respect for Persons . . . incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first that
individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection ....
HeinOnline -- 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 31 1993-1994
1993] HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 31
Then one can readily overlook that he means to invoke the principle of
beneficence only for research with incompetent subjects. He suggests that with
competent subjects a "morally valid consent" is essential. Yet, later on he
seems to modify his position when he writes: "It is the investigator who
decides how much to tell the patient or family, what facts to emphasize, which
to withhold, and how to present them.'m Second, Pellegrino repeatedly shifts
from issues germane to therapy to those that pertain to research without clearly
distinguishing between the two settings. Thus, Pellegrino may be correct in
saying that one of the value conflicts "for medicine ... is beneficence toward
the patient,'>73 but for clinical research with competent patients, respect for
autonomy must be the guiding principle.
At times, Pellegrino seems to agree. He writes that
[t]he intellectual autonomy of the scientist is autonomy held in trust, ... [i.e.]
the conscious acknowledgement by the investigator that he or she is allowed
freedom to pursue rigorous scientific goals in human experimentation only if
the welfare of the patient is always respected as primary and superior to the
To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons' considered opinions and
choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are clearly detrimental
to others.
In most cases of research involving human subjects, respect for persons demands that
subjects enter into research voluntarily and with adequate information.
2. Beneficence. Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their
decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-
being.
The obligations of beneficence affects both individual investigators and society at large,
because they extend both to particular research projects and to the entire enterprise of
research.
[d. at 4-7.
The examples given for justifying invocation of the principle of beneficence, however, address
only vulnerable populations, e.g., children, prisoners, and the mentally ill. Yet, in setting forth
three principles for the general conduct of research and then appealing to such vague terms of art
as protection from "harm" and securing "well-being," for invoking the beneficence principle, can
readily create the impression that with competent subjects too, autonomy may at unspecified times
have to yield to beneficence. Respect for persons deserved a more unequivocal, or at least more
precise, formulation.
For an interesting discussion of serious difficulties in the Belmont Report, see Ernest Marshall,
Does the Moral Philosophy of the Belmont Report Rest on a Mistake? 8 IRB 5-6 (Nov.-Dec.
1986). He notes, for example. that "the point of Kantian principles is precisely to say that certain
things cannot be 'balanced out,' Le., if certain actions are unjust or disrespectful of persons then
they are wrong and therefore simply should not be done." [d. at 6.
72. Pellegrino, supra note 67, at 24.
73. [d. at 21.
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values of science and self-interest.74
[Vol. 38:7
Pellegrino's use of the word "welfare" could suggest that it encompasses not
only prevention of physical injury but also respect for subjects' autonomous
choice. Welfare, however, is often used only to refer to preventing physical
injury; therefore, it would have been better if he had emphasized that in
clinical research with competent subjects it only pertains to respect for
autonomy.
I raise these issues also because Pellegrino places so· milch faith in "the
personal morality of the clinical investigator" whom he considers "the ultimate
safeguard of the safety of the experimental human subject.,,75 But his hybrid
concept "autonomy held in trust," an amalgam of autonomy and benevolence,
alienates the rights of subjects to be authors of their own fate. The implied
idea that investigators ;rre permitted to exercise a trusteeship over persons'
autonomy is particularly problematic in today's world where respect for
subjects' self-determination is not as abiding a motivating consideration in the
conduct of research as is the advancement of science for the sake of
mankind.76
Respect for autonomy imposes numerous burdens on the physician-
investigator. First, he must not allow disclosures to be shaped by paternalistic
or beneficent concerns that patient-subjects will make decisions which are not
in their "best interests." Second, he or she must not allow disclosures to be
shaped by concerns that patient-subjects will learn that the customary
treatments which they may continue to take, should they decline the more
promising experimental treatments, offer no hope for the alleviation of their
suffering. Nor should disclosures be shaped by concerns that patient-subjects'
trust in medicine will be undermined once they learn about the uncertainties
inherent in all medical treatments, nor by concerns over I,1psetting hospitalized
patients if they were to appreciate that they, too, are being asked to yield their
individual interests to the interests of scientific investigations.
Moreover, physician-investigators must reflect on the fateful impact of
their commitment to the ideology of medical science-its ethos to acquire
knowledge for the sake of mankind-on the invitation to participation in
research. Medical scientists share with their colleagues from the natural
sciences a commitment to the pursuit of truth, objectivity, and the advancement
74. [d. at 26.
75. [d. at 21.
76. The personal morality of the investigator would not be impugned if he or she were to
give greater weight to the advancement of science than to autonomy. Indeed, Pellegrino noted
that an investigator "faces a difficult task of balancing and ordering the values of truth and
beneficence against each other." Id. at 25. Thus, the question remains whether "autonomy-in-
trust" permits such balancing with both competent and incompetent subjects. Since his recent
paper is a major contribution to the ethics of research, I discussed it at some length. I can only
hope that I interpreted him correctly.
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of knowledge. The commitment to objectivity invites investigators' thought
processes to become objectified and, in tum, to transform the human beings
who are the subjects of research into data points to be plotted on a chart that
will prove or disprove a research hypothesis.
Margaret Radin's observations about objectification illuminate this
problem. In an article on women and people of color she noted that
[0]bjectification comes about through subordination when one culture
conceives of certain characteristics of persons ... as marks of lesser
personhood. These marks license manipulation of those who bear the marks,
and also license refusal to recognize in them rights and other indices of respect
otherwise conceived of as universally applicable to persons.n
This license was usurped or conferred on physicians' in clinical practice, and
since the age of medical science has been .extended to .clinical .research.
Objectification begins with patients and becomes intensified when subordina-
tion is also affected by attitudes toward gender, color, religion, social and
economic status and, of course, by the scientific imperative ofclinical research.
Furthermore, human beings should not be used lightly and cheaply to serve
as means for the ends of others, even though they are' so readily available in
large numbers. Prior to extending an invitation to subjects, physician-
investigators must give thought to the minimal number of subjects required for
obtaining satisfactory answers to a research question and must conduct a
literature search of existing studies which will make a repetition of an
experiment unnecessary. Science's commitment to truth and progress,
particularly when human beings are needed for purposes of research, ought to
disdain inquiries where the truth is already apparent and progress already a
reality.
Finally, as I have already suggested, physician-investigators must go to
considerable length in extending the invitation to participate in clinical research
so that they can rest assured that patient-subjects understand the implications
of their consent. Pellegrino, in his discussion of "valid consent," sensitively
describes the difficulty patients experience in '·'[separating] the physician-
scientist role from the physician-healer."78 He further notes that "[t]he
77. Margaret J. Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 341,346 (1991).
Pellegrino is similarly concerned when he writes that "the values and standards [of science
necessitate] a certain degree of objectivization of the subject under study. But in clinical
investigations, the 'object' of study remains a human being." Thus, he cautions that "the canons
of science may conflict with another set of values-those that define the endeavor of medicine."
Pellegrino, supra note 67, at 22.
The objectification of patients is also illustrated by investigators' concerns in the outcome of
a new treatment in terms of longeVity while patients may be more concerned about the quality of
life offered by one or the other treatment. For a detailed and sensitive discussion, see CHARLES
FRIED, MEDICAL ExPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1974).
78. Pellegrino, supra note 67, at 25.
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physician can easily obtain consent to an experimental protocol simply by
emphasizing the hope of cure and downplaying the risk and the experimental
nature of the treatment.,,79 He cautions physicians that "[a] legally adequate
consent form may not be morally valid [for a] morally valid consent aims at
true 'con-sent,' an agreeing together."so
Only respect for persons' autonomy and self-determination can guarantee
"true 'con-sent,' an agreeing together"; otherwise, the invitation subtly
becomes a request or even a demand. Invocation of the principle of
beneficence, in the service of shielding patient-subjects from painful
disclosures, can only mislead physician-investigators into "downplaying the
risk and the experimental nature of the treatment." Whenever beneficence
suggests withholding of information, the better solution would be to exclude
patient-subjects from participation in clinical research.
C. The Conversation
To obtain a "morally valid consent [which] aims at true consent," is an
inordinately difficult task. The physician-investigators must disclose to their
subjects at least the following information: (1) that the subjects are not only
patients and, to the extent to which they are patients, that their therapeutic
interests, even if not incidental, will be subordinated to scientific interests; (2)
that it is problematic and indeterminate whether their welfare will be better
served by placing their medical fate in the hands of a physician rather than an
investigator; (3) that in opting for the care of a physician they may be better
or worse off and for such and such reasons; (4) that clinical research will allow
doctors to penetrate the mysteries of medicine's uncertainties about which
treatments are best, dangerous, or ineffective; (5) that clinical research may
possibly be in the patient's immediate best interest, perhaps promise benefits
in the future, or provide no benefit, particularly if the patient is assigned to a
control (placebo) arm of a study; (6) that research is governed by a research
protocol and a research question and, therefore, his or her interests and needs
will yield to the claims of science; and (7) that physician-investigators will
respect whatever decision the subject ultimately makes.
Conversing with patient-subjects in such a manner which will give them
a clearer appreciation of the difference between clinical research and therapy
is a daunting assignment. I have on occasions been asked, "How will
investigators know when to stop the conversation?" My response has been
that they will know when to stop once they have learned to begin the
conversation with a commitment to respect for personhood; for only then will
they not shirk their responsibility to be utterly forthright in disclosing the
research dimension of their work and the alternatives available to their patient-
79. [d.
80. [d. at 24.
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subjects. It is the spirit in which the conversation begins which is the
problem. If that problem is better resolved, the end will take care of itself.
Levine once wrote that in the current climate of extending the invitation
to participation in research, "[the informed consent] requirement [serves] as a
pledge made by researchers that in the pursuit of their salutary mission they
will not exploit people; [or that i]ndividual persons will not be involved as
research subjects without their awareness or approval."SI If he meant by
"pledge" a symbolic gesture "to secure and maintain public confidence in
scientific research,,,s2 rather than a true commitment, I would agree.
Guido Calabresi years ago expressed his doubts about informed consent
serving as a "control system" for the value conflicts inherent in the conduct of
research. He did not believe that it could in practice serve such a purpose. His
argument was that "[c]onsent or its semblance keeps us from blatantly
[destroying] the fabric of our commitment to human dignity."s3 I am not
convinced that informed consent need only serve such a limited symbolic
function once the idea of shared decision making becomes a guiding
commitment. Levine's and Calabresi's observations, however, identify the
mutual deceptions in which scientists and the public engage in order not to
unduly impede scientific research. The public, propelled by its longings to
benefit from the advancement of science, has made common cause with
scientists' demand for freedom of inquiry by acquiescing to the human costs
which research entails. The symbolic bow to informed consent then allows the
public and scientists to have it both ways. Forcing a public debate on the
morality of human experimentation may put an end to the all too silent evasion
of confronting any tragic choices that must be made. To be sure, "public
confidence in scientific research" is justified on the ground that physician-
investigators will take great care in not exposing patient-subjects to unneces-
sary physical harm. But this is a different matter.
The disclosure obligations I have set forth so far emphasize the need to
pay particular attention to explaining to patient-subjects how participation in
research differs from how they would ordinarily be treated or would expect to
be treated. Thus, the first task in extending the invitation is to be absolutely
clear about the research dimension of the invitation, its implications and
possible consequences. Such disclosures do not require patient-subjects to
understand the esoteric knowledge of medicine and science. Indeed, at present,
subjects are overwhelmed with unnecessary scientific information that clarifies
little and serves more the purpose of obscuring the crucial information that
81. Robert J. Levine, Deferred Consent, 12 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 546 (1991)
(emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Guido Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 387,
404 (1969).
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they need to know,84 such as the risks, benefits, alternatives, and uncertainties
which patient-subjects face by their participation in clinical research, and the
impact of participation, known arid conjectured, on the quality of their future
lives. Investigators have an obligation to translate scientific information into
language which is relevant to patient-subjects' life and interests. Informed
consent forms are so incomprehensible because they are written at a higher
reading level than is appropriate for the intended population.85 In addition,
they include too much distracting technical information of little consequence
to the decisions which patient-subjects must make. Put another way, current
informed consent forms often provide IRBs rather than the subjects with a
better understanding of investigators' intentions.
Physician-scientists will be reluctant to converse with patient-subjects in
the spirit of the recommendation that I have outlined.86 Such conversations
take time, may have to extend over hours, perhaps even days, and must be
continued until one is reasonably certain that the patient-subjects understand.
84. Alan Meisel has argued that the problem of the unreadability of informed consent fonns
is better resolved not "by improving [their] readability [but by abolishing them, even prohibiting]
them by legal fiat if necessary." He then goes on to say that
[t]he problem is not the unreadability of consent forms; that is merely symptomatic. The
real problem is that physicians, for the most part, do not consider informed consent to be
an important part of the practice of medicine. . .. Consent forms play no role in the
informed consent process. Where used, they are intended merely to memorialize that in
fact the informed consent process transpired.
Meisel, supra note 34.
Abolishing informed consent forms will not improve matters. As Meisel observed, physicians
do not consider informed consent important and such attitudes will infect the oral informed
consent process as well. Informed consent forms can be improved if their function were to truly
inform patient-subjects about matters crucial to their decision. Too often they do not serve this
purpose. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
85. Considerable literature exists on the "readability" of informed consent forms. For a
recent article, see James R. Ogloff & Randy K. Otto, Are Research Participants Truly Informed?
Readability of Informed Consent Forms Used in Research, 4 ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR 239-252
(1991).
86. Royall discusses some of the obstacles to informed consent:
A more prosaic reason why informed consent is not a panacea is that in many cases it
simply won't work. Sometimes too few patients will agree to participate in the study.
And sometimes the consent process is simply too uncomfortable and time-consuming.
Many physicians are reluctant to share their uncertainties with patients, and many patients
do not want to hear about such uncertainties. Also, many patients know so little about
research that to make them truly understand what they are being asked to do and why, to
make their consent truly "informed," would require more time and effort than can
reasonably be invested.
Royall, supra note 19, at 58. Since we have not had sufficient experience with an informed
consent process as advocated in my article, we do not know whether it will work or not. Surely
the process will require time and effort, but such a price must be paid if consent is to be taken
seriously.
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Of course, subjects may still make decisions which they later on will regret
because they then believe, perhaps correctly so, that they had not given their
participation the thought it deserved. This is inevitable, and physician-
investigators must not allow that possibility to tailor their disclosures in order
to avoid burdening subjects with guilt feelings over having made the wrong
decision (another variant of beneficence) or that they will agree to what
investigators believe to be in subjects' better interests. Autonomous persons
must be held responsible for their own mistakes and must not be protected
from making them by subterfuge. As Justice Stevens once put it when he
spoke about a pregnant woman's distress in deciding whether or not to
undergo an abortion. "[I]t is far better to permit some persons to make
incorrect decisions than to deny all individuals the right to make decisions that
have a profound effect upon their destiny."87
Thus, recruitment of subjects will prove to be more time consuming.
Completion of research may also be delayed and, if too many patients refuse,
selection bias will make some research impossible to conduct. Not only may
scientific progress be impeded but physician-investigators' self-interests in
recognition and advancement of their careers may be jeopardized.88 Scientific
discoveries do not occur in isolation and, more often than not, scientists in
many centers are pursuing similar inquires. The imperative to publish first is
of crucial personal significance, because so much depends on it in terms of
recognition, fame, future grants and prospects. A commitment to disclosure
and consent entails paying a great personal price which can be moderated,
however, if the collectivity of physician-investigators embrace these responsi-
bilities or find new ways of conducting research which will make forthright
disclosures less of a burden.89 It is also a great professional price to pay
87. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169,
2189-90 (1986).
. 88. Pellegrino has given an excellent account of the impact on research practices of
investigators' self-interests, be they advancement of careers, economic rewards, etc., or of their
institutions' arrangements with pharmaceutical companies and other industries. Pellegrino, supra
note 67, at 24-25. "[T]hey pose a potential danger to experimental subjects. They can compro-
mise beneficence, the central value in medicine." [d. at 25.
89. Marcia Angell states:
I find it difficult to justify strategies to increase the accrual of patients if the result is that
people do not act as they would if full and necessarily neutral information had been
provided. It might be better in this situation to consider alternatives to randomized
clinical trials. Several workers have emphasized that it is often scientifically adequate to
use non-randomized controls in trials of treatments . . .. A final alternative, which
deserves more attention, is better and more systematic analysis of available information;
this might in some instances obviate the necessity for new studies.
Marcia Angell, Patients' Preferences in Randomized Clinical Trials, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1385, 1386 (1984).
Science desires randomized clinical trials, it does not demand them. . . . [T]he importance
of randomized trials is exaggerated by the false dichotomy that is implied when historical
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because physician-investigators come to research out of a deeply felt
dissatisfaction with the current state of medical knowledge and out of a painful
awareness of the suffering of their patients.
Insufficient attention has also been paid to the current reality which places
physician-investigators at the mercy of the institutions in which they work and
the private and public grant agencies which support their research. Medical
research since World War II has become a research-industrial complex.
Academic institutions rely on the revenues which accrue from the assessment
of indirect costs to the providers of grants. Research proposals have to be
generated and completed at a rapid rate to assure future grant support. Thus,
investigators are under considerable pressure to recruit subjects as quickly as
possible to support the institutions' buildings, laboratories, staff and salaries.
With respect to career advancement and future grant support, physician-
investigators are thus the victims of an institutional system (their own
institutions and the National Institutes of Health) which penalizes them if in
fulfillment of their ethical disclosure obligations toward patient-subjects, the
pace of research would be slowed. Both at the national and local levels this
problem deserves careful consideration and sustained discussion.90
VII. A NATIONAL HUMAN INvESTIGATION BOARD
The moral ambiguities inherent in the contemporary regulations of human
research are also an inevitable consequence of policy makers' unwillingness
to confront openly the lengths to which a democratic society like ours should
go in protecting citizen-subjects' rights to autonomy and bodily integrity for
control trials are the only alternative discussed. In fact many of the weaknesses of
historical controls can be avoided by using concurrent non-randomized controls. And of
course comparing a treatment with both historical and concurrent controls can provide
even stronger evidence about its efficacy.
Royall, supra note 19, at 60.
90. Pellegrino has commented on some of these problems:
Institutional pride or hubris is ... a corrosive influence. The institution's drive to be
"first" is a mixed motive; it can be effective in raising institutional morale and
productivity, but it is also capable of submerging moral imperatives on grounds of
exigency and "survival." In competition with other hospitals and universities, institutional
pride can desensitize an institutional review board to certain dubious projects.
Pellegrino, supra, note 67, at 24.
The matter is further complicated when the health care industry enters long-term
contractual arrangements with a university to support research. The usual proviso is that
a company will support research facilities and personnel in return for privileged access
and a share in the patenting rights to the products developed. These industry-university
compacts are especially attractive today when governmental and philanthropic sources of
research funding are insufficient. Some of our most prestigious universities have entered
into what may well turn out to be Faustian compacts.
[d. at 25.
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the sake of medical science. I have already suggested that whatever societal
mandate exists for the conduct of human research has not been subjected to
intensive congressional and public scrutiny as to the morality and legality of
the enterprise. Instead, as Edmond Cahn once put it, we have been all too
willing, in our longing to conquer disease and death, "to possess the end and
yet not be responsible for the means, to grasp the fruit while disavowing the
tree, to escape being told the cost, until someone else has paid it irrevoca-
bly."91
The policy questions underlying the tensions between the inviolability of
subjects of research and advancing the frontiers of knowledge require more
careful articulation and resolution than can be gleaned from the federal
regulations so far enacted.92 The concerns I have raised and the recommen-
dations I have made need to be examined, debated and decided by a national
regulatory body to which the IRBs can also turn for advice and guidance on
difficult problems that require resolution.
The need for such a regulatory body, which I had already explored in
Experimentation With Human Beings,93 was supported by my colleagues who
served with me on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel. We
had been appointed by the Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare "to investigate the circumstances surrounding
the Tuskegee, Alabama, study of untreated syphilis in the male Negro initiated
by the United States Public Health Service in 1932."94 Our primary assign-
ments were to make recommendations as to whether the Study should be
terminated, to pass judgment on the ethics of the Study from its inception, and
to make recommendations about necessary changes in "existing policies to
protect the rights of patients participating in health research.,,9s
Among the many recommendations we made with respect to the third
assignment, one urged that Congress establish a permanent body, which we
called the National Human Investigation Board (NHIB), with the authority to
regulate at least all federally supported research involving human subjects. We
suggested that
[t]he primary responsibility of the National Human Investigation Board should
be to formulate research policies, in much greater detail and with much more
clarity than is presently the case. The Board [should also] promulgate detailed
procedures to govern the implementation of its policies by institutional review
committees. It [should] also promulgate procedures for the review of research
decisions and their consequences. In particular. this Board should establish
91. Edmond Cabn, Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience, in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY
255, 260 (Paul Talalay ed. 1988).
92. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
93. EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 40, at 856-954.
94. TuSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 3. at 2.
95. [d. at 1.
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procedures for the publication of important institutional committee and Board
decisions. Publication of such decisions would permit their intensive study
both inside and outside the medical profession and would be a first step toward
the case-by-case development of policies governing human experimentation.
We [saw] such a development, analogous to the experience of the common
law, as the best hope for ultimately providing workable standards for the
regulation of the human experimentation process.96
Senator Edward Kennedy incorporated that proposal in a bill submitted to
the Senate.97 His bill was never enacted and I believe that a major reason
was the Senate's reluctance to expose to public view the value conflicts
inherent in the conduct of research. Had the Senate seriously debated the bill,
it would have been forced to consider whether inadequately informed subjects
should ever serve as means for society's and science's ends. Instead, by
inaction, it left such painful decisions to the low visibility handiwork of local
IRBs.
I believed then, as I do now, that the rejection of a National Human
Investigation Board was a mistake for many reasons.98 Most importantly, it
precludes greater public visibility of the decisions made in the conduct of
human experimentation. Current practices do not provide for either institu-
tional review committees' publication of, or free access to, such decisions.
This low level of visibility not only hampers efforts to evaluate and learn from
attempts to resolve the complex problems of human research but also prevents
the public at large from reacting to what is being done for the sake of the
advancement of science.
Local IRBs cannot assume these and other functions that a National
Human Investigation Board could serve, for yet another reason. As George
Annas has observed, "IRBs as currently constituted do not protect research
subjects but rather protect the institution and the institution's investigator.,,99
There is considerable truth to his allegation. The majority of IRB
members are on the faculty of the institutions to which the investigators
96. Id. at 24.
97. S. 2072, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
98. Such a Board, for example, should promulgate detailed regulations for research with
vulnerable subjects. Moreover, it would have to address Ackerman's concerns that any absolute
commitment to autonomy "suffers from fatal difficulties in an important range of situations. It
is widely agreed that individuals have duties of beneficence to prevent substantial harm to other
specific persons when doing so will involve no more than modest costs to their own interests."
Terrence F. Ackerman, Balancing Moral Principles in Federal Regulations on Human Research,
14 IRB 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1992). If these concerns have merit, then the Board could consider Caplan's
suggestion that a "general obligation [be imposed on persons] to participate in research." Arthur
L. Caplan, Is there a Duty to Serve as a Subject in Biomedical Research?, 6 IRB at 1-5 (Sept.-
Oct. 1984).
99. GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE 331 (1988).
HeinOnline -- 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 41 1993-1994
1993] HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 41
belong. lOO They not only share similar interests and objectives but they also
know, when sitting in judgment of a research protocol, that their proposals
may soon be subjected to similar scrutiny. Thus, particularly in the murky
area of informed consent, it is unlikely that members of IRBs will hold
investigators to a standard of disclosure and consent that would protect the
subjects of research if doing so would place impediments on the conduct of
research and, in turn, affect the well being of their colleagues in decisive
ways.IOI
VIII. A CASE EXAMPLE
A research study conducted at the Neuropsychiatric Institute of the
University of California, Los Angles, (UCLA) ,which began in the early 1980s
and is still in progress, illustrates the problems I have discussed. To orient the
reader, I briefly summarize three facts about the design of the experiment and
two facts about its aftermath that are of concern to me: (1) The study required
schizophrenic patients who had recovered from their psychotic disorders to be
withdrawn from medication even though "[ilt is generally accepted that
maintenance antipsychotic medication will benefit a substantial proportion of
chronic schizophrenics."I02 (2) The study expected to produce a relapse
(recurrence of symptomatology) in many patient-subjects in order to attain its
objective to predict better relapse, particularly of those who would exhibit such
severe symptoms as "bizarre behavior, self-neglect, hostility, depressive mood
100. For example, the IRB at Yale-New Haven Medical Center "currently consists of 26
members of whom 15 are full-time medical school faculty.... The other 11 committee members
include [5 persons affiliated with the Medical Center], a psychological counselor who has ... no
[such] affiliation, 4 medical students ... and 1 student from the School of Public Health."
Enncs AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL REsEARCH, supra note 57, at 330.
101. For a more critical assessment of IRBs, see ANNAS, supra note 99, at 331-33. For an
opposing assessment, see Enncs AND REGULATIONS OF CLINICAL REsEARCH, supra note 57. at
341-350.
102. Keith H. Nuechterlein & Michael Gitlin, Research Protocol for Developmental Processes
in Schizophrenic Disorders Project: Protocol; Double Blind Crossover and Withdrawal of
Neuroleptics in Remitted. Recent-Onset Schizophrenia, HSPC #86-07-336 1, 6 [hereinafter
Protocol] (on file with author). In a 1988 article the investigators gave a clear account of these
research objectives:
The present study is a prospective examination of prodromal signs and symptoms of
schizophrenic relapse, using a systematic and carefully controlled research design. One
important improvement over the previous studies is that relapse ,was defined as the
elevation of psychiatric symptoms to the severe or extremely severe level. Thus, minor
symptom fluctuations that might often be inconsequential were not considered relapses.
In contrast to the studies that defined the period of observation by the necessity to
increase medication to avoid a possible relapse, we can be certain that any prodromal
changes that we isolated actually did precede a clear relapse.
Kenneth L. Subotnik & Keith N. Nuechterlein, Prodromal Signs and Symptoms in Schizophrenic
Relapse, 97 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 405,406 (1988).
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and suicidability."lo3 (3) The infonned consent fonn signed by the partici-
pants was inadequate in disclosing to the subjects the risks which their
participation entailed. (4) The IRB approved the research protocol and
infonned consent fonn without asking the investigators for clarifications that
might have led the IRB to better protect the subjects of research. (5) The
subsequent response to the review of the study by the National Institutes of
Health's Office for the Protection of Research Risks (OPRR) did not go far in
remedying the problems which came to OPRR's attention.
I also want to emphasize at the outset that my analysis is limited to a
review of one of the research protocols, including the infonned consent fonn
approved by UCLA's IRB, the action taken by the OPRR, once parents of one
of the subjects had lodged a complaint about the study and a perusal of the
psychiatric literature pertinent to the research project. 104 I cannot address
what might have been disclosed to the subjects in conversations between them
and the investigators; about that I have no knowledge. I can only note that the
data available from the protocol and the OPRR review hardly suggests that
scrupulous attention was paid at any point to full disclosure and consent.
The UCLA experiment was designed to make an important contribution to
a better understanding of the need for continuous medication following
patients' recovery from a recent onset of schizophrenic disorder. Thus, the
research project sought to identify patients who can function without
medication because antipsychotic medication can cause tardive dyskinesia, a
syndrome consisting of involuntary and potentially irreversible movements for
which no known treatment exists. lOS
All potential patient-subjects were being followed in UCLA's After Care
CliniC. 106 The study, according to the protocol, consisted of two sequential
phases. 107 In the first phase, lasting for twenty-four weeks, the patient-
subjects were randomized, in a double-blind design,108 to one of two groups.
The first group received a standardized dose of 12.5 mgm of prolyxin
decanoate, an antipsychotic medication, every two weeks, while the second
was injected with a placebo, an inert, therapeutically ineffective substance.
After twelve weeks, the injections given to members of each group were
reversed so that those who had been receiving medication now received a
103. Id.
104. These and all other discussed unpublished documents are in the possession of the author
and available upon request.
105. In some patients symptoms of tardive dyskinesia disappear within several months after
antipsychotic drugs are withdrawn, but withdrawal of antipsychotic medication does not guarantee
that symptoms will vanish. In some patients, symptoms may persist indefinitely. DoRLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICI10NARY 517-18 (27th ed. 1988).
106. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
107. Protocol, supra note 102.
108. See supra note 30.
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placebo, and vice versa. In the second phase, "all clinically appropriate
patients" received no medication, i.e., those who were still on prolyxin were
also deprived of the active drug. 109
The patient-subjects were then followed for at least one year unless "1)
the subject withdraws permission for the study or 2) clinical relapse or
psychotic exacerbation occurs.,,110 Criteria for psychotic relapse included
"[high scores on test measures] for Hallucinations, Unusual Thought Content,
or Conceptual Disorganization; [for] psychotic exacerbation [fairly severe
recurrence of symptomatology; and] for relapse-other type, [high scores] on
scales of bizarre behavior; self-neglect, hostility, depressive mood, and
suicidability.""l Apparently the patient-subject's therapist was authorized
in the first double-blind phase of the study to break the code for "clinical
reasons" but the protocol contained no information, and therefore the IRB
could not know, as to when the therapist might take such action. Clearly the
intent was to tolerate severe recurrences in symptomatology. Once that had
happened "the patient [would] be withdrawn from the study.,,112
The investigators noted in the protocol's section on "Potential Benefits"
that since "no study shows 100% relapse in schizophrenics withdrawn from
antipsychotics, unquestioned maintenance treatment may for any particular
patient involve much risk and little benefit. At present, there is little consistent
data regarding predictive factors for patients at low risk of relapse without
pharmacotherapy."ll3 In that section the investigators also stated
that clinical relapse or psychotic exacerbation can be expected to occur in at
least some of our patient subjects. However; since most of our patients have
been requesting drug withdrawal for months, and since our knowledge as to
which acute schizophrenic patients will relapse following drug withdrawal is
very meager; we feel this risk is justified, especially in view of the risk of
tardive dyskinesia with long-term antipsychotic use. Withdrawal from
antipsychotic medication one year after the psychotic episode is not unusual in
standard psychiatric practice for patients with acute, nonchronic schizophrenia,
since little clear evidence exists regarding longer-term prophylactic effects for
this nonchronic population. 114
It is true that many schizophrenic patients complain about the side effects of
anti-psychotic medication. However, therapists who believe that such
treatment is clinically indicated generally do their level best to impress on
patients the need for remaining on medication or to encourage its resumption
as soon as symptoms recur. In the UCLA study, on the other hand, all patients
109. Protocol, supra note 102, at 4.
llO. Id. at 6.
lli. Id. (emphasis supplied).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Protocol, supra note 102, at 8.
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were withdrawn from medication, indeed required to do so, for research
purposes until the needs of the study, and not those of the individual patient,
had been satisfied. lIS The expectation of relapse was an integral aspect of
the research design; it was not an unfortunate consequence of treatment but
one which the investigators deliberately induced. This is particularly
problematic because of the continuing controversy in psychiatric circles as to
whether relapse leads to additional, at times irreversible, injury.1I6
The consent form submitted to the IRB for review and approval informed
prospective patient-subjects that "the purpose of this study is to take people
like me off medication in a way that will give the most information about the
medication, its effects on me, on others and on the way the brain works."l17
It mentioned that an inactive substance (placebo) or an (active) medication
would be randomly administered during the first phase and that then "all
medication will be stopped and that I will continue to receive regular care at
the UCLA After Care Clinic."lIs Stating it in that way could only confuse
potential subjects. In the same sentence they were told that medication would
be stopped and that they would continue to receive regular care, without
alerting them in most explicit language that "regular care" was compromised
by the withdrawal of medication. 1I9
liS. The protocol does not make clear whether all the patient-subjects had been on medication
for at least one year when enrolled in the study, which, according to the investigators, is the time
when "in standard psychiatric practice" patients are often taken off medication. [d.
116. Although the issue is far from settled, many psychiatrists believe that relapse can be
permanently harmful to patients: "[S]ome patients are left with a damaging residual if a
psychosis is allowed to proceed unmitigated." Richard J. Wyatt, Neuroleptics and the Natural
Course of Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN 325, 347 (1991). "[N]euroleptic drugs
... if they fully control all acute episodes, may protect against the otherwise inevitable decline
of mental function," R. Miller, Schizophrenia as a Progressive Disorder: Relations to EEG, CT,
Neuropathological and Other Evidence, 33 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 17, 35 (1989).
117. Keith Nuechterlein, Informed Consent Agreement for Patients (Version I): Double-Blind
Drug Crossover and Withdrawal Project I (July 1988) [hereinafter Consent Agreement 1] (on file
with author).
118. [d.
119. Being absolutely clear on this point was important since the subjects were recruited from
the Continuing Care Program of The Neuropsychiatric Institute UCLA. The brochure, given to
patients enrolled in this program, contained the following information:
THE CONTINUING CARE PROGRAM ...
. . . is a specialty service combining treatment, research, and training in the care of the
individual with psychotic symptoms. Jointly sponsored by NIMH, UCLA, Camarillo-NIP,
and the Clinical Research Center, the Program offers continuing care to people who are
experiencing their first psychotic episode.
The Program includes inpatient and outpatient treatment as well as an active follow-up
evaluation of each person. Fully integrated with these services is a research project aimed
at increasing understanding and knowledge of the factors that are related to relapse and
remission.
PURPOSE
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Moreover, the patient-subjects were not informed at the beginning of the
study that already during the first phase they would not necessarily receive
optimal individual treatment, but only a standardized dose of 12.5 mg of
prolyxin. Such a standardized dose can itself lead either to a return of
symptomatology or produce unnecessary side effects because it is known that
the amount of prolyxin must be tailored to the individual needs of patients
with some requiring larger or smaller amounts of medication. 120 The consent
form then goes on to describe in considerable detail the psychological tests that
would be administered to the patient-subject during the study period. That
aspect of the research could have been presented in a more abbreviated fashion
and surely, in light of other omissions, did not deserve the space it was given.
The goal of the Program is to assist persons in making a successful adaptation to life in
the community and to improve their daily living and social skills. An equally important
goal is to facilitate the family's coping skills for dealing with mental illness. Where
appropriate, consultation with other community agencies and social support networks is
provided.
AFrERCARE CLINIC
A range of outpatient services are offered through the Aftercare Clinic at the UCLA
Neuropsychiatric Institute. Following discharge, patients and their families are provided:
Group Therapy: in small groups, patients learn problem-solving skills and
interpersonal effectiveness.
Family Education: counseling is aimed to upgrade the entire family's coping
skills and understanding of the illness. and to facilitate use of resources both within
the family and the community.
Medication is administered at the lowest optimal dose to maximize coping with
symptoms and stressors and to minimize side effects.
PARTICIPATION
... is voluntary by patients and families in both the research and the clinical services.
It is expected that a voluntary agreement to participate for a minimum of two years be
made at the point a patient joins the Program.
UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute, Continuing Care Program of the Mental Health Clinical Center
1-3 (on file with author). Since the Aftercare program serves dual objectives. treatment and
research, any experimental interventions needed to be specified and differentiated from therapy
with the greatest of care, particularly whenever the research component compromised therapeutic
intentions.
120. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 619 (47th ed. 1993) ("Appropriate dosage of Prolyxin
Decanoate (Fluphenazine Decanoate Injection) should be individualized for each patient. ... The
optimal amount of the drug and the frequency of administration must be determined for each
patient, since dosage requirements have been found to vary with clinical circumstances as well
as with individual response to the drug."); TEXTBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHIATRY 682 (Stuart C.
Yudosky & Robert E. Hales eds., 2d ed. 1991) ("Blood levels vary widely in different patients
given the same dose of a neuroleptic. . .. [T]here is no established correlation between serum
concentration and clinical response."); Robert F. Asarnow & Stephen R. Marder, Differential
Effect of Low and Conventional Doses of Fluphenazine on Schizophrenic Outpatients with Good
or Poor Information-Processing Abilities, 45 ARCIUVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 822 (1988).
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With respect to significant risks and benefits the following information was
provided:
I understand that during blood drawing, I may experience pain from the
needle prick, a small amount of bleeding, infection or black and blue marks at
the site of the needle mark which will disappear in about 10 days.
I understand that because of the withdrawal of active medication, I may
become worse during this study and that either a relapse of my initial
symptoms or new symptoms may occur. I understand that I will not be
charged for the active medication or the placebo that I am provided during this
study. If I do show a significant return of symptoms, I understand the clinic
staff will use active medication again to improve my condition. If I would
require hospitalization during this study, although this is not likely, I
understand that the clinic staff would help to arrange an appropriate hospital-
ization but the research project would not pay for the hospitalization.
I understand that I may benefit from this study by being taken off
medication in a careful way while under close medical supervision. The
potential benefits to science in this study are that it will increase my doctor's
knowledge of the relationship between the medication, its effect on people such
as myself, and on the way the brain functions in certain forms of mental
illness.
I understand that my condition may improve, worsen or remain unchanged
from participation in this study.121
No information was provided as to what constituted a "significant return of
symptoms," that it could mean a return of hallucinations, conceptual
disorganization, self-neglect, depressive mood, or suicidal ideation. Potential
patient-subjects under the care of mental health professionals in an Aftercare
Clinic might very well have believed that "significant" did not encompass such
dire consequences. Moreover, while it was acknowledged that "I may become
worse," the consent form of July 1988 did not state that at that time it was
known that of those patient-subjects enrolled in the study so far, eighty-eight
percent had suffered a relapse. 122
In light of the high relapse rate it was misleading to aver "that my
condition may improve, worsen or remain unchanged." The odds favoring
121. Consent Agreement I, supra note 117, at 2.
122. Of the 24 patients who entered the drug withdrawal period, 21 have ultimately had
psychotic exacerbations or relapses, ranging from 17 to 123 weeks after the last fluphenazine
administration. For these 21 exacerbation/relapses plus the 3 psychotic exacerbations during the
placebo phase of the crossover, the mean time to exacerbation/relapse is 33 weeks. Of these 24
patients who have developed an exacerbation/relapse after medication discontinuation, 5
exacerbation/relapses occurred after 60 or more weeks (21 %), 6 after 40-59 weeks (25%), 7 after
20-39 weeks (29%). 4 after 10-19 weeks (17%), and 2 after less than 10 weeks (8%). Three
more remain well after 104, 30 and 23 weeks. Keith H. Nuechteriein, Grant Application:
Developmental Processes in Schizophrenic Disorders, RD 1 MH 37705-07, 1,84 (Nov. IS, 1988)
(on file with author).
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relapse were far too great; few subjects would "improve" or "remain the
same," Finally, it is not only ironic but also misleading that the risks of a
needle prick were discussed in such exquisite detail. Such a forthcoming and
honest acknowledgement could only leave patient-subjects with the impression
that the investigators would disclose any other risks in similar detail and with
similar candor.
The informed consent form should have highlighted in bold face that the
primary objective of the study was to advance knowledge for the sake of future
patients and, depending on outcome, only of value to some of the subjects'
future well-being. The form, further, should have acknowledged that the study
was not designed to attend to their individual therapeutic needs, and that the
subjects exposed themselves to considerable risks. Moreover, the patient-
subjects were not presented with any information about the merits of not
joining the research project. They were deprived of considering that
alternative. To be sure, the informed consent form must be supplemented by
the oral infomied consent process123 and the latter may be more important
than the former in providing patient-subjects with meaningful disclosures,
particularly since the forms are generally written in such incomprehensible
language. When, however, as in this instance, the written document provided
incomplete information, and with insufficient candor, patient-subjects who are
intent on reading it are deprived of crucial information. From a different
perspective, the consent form, as written, cannot help but create concerns,
though most difficult to substantiate, as to whether the oral informed consent
was similarly flawed. l24
123. UCLA claims to have presented much of the infonnation required for infonned consent
to patient-subject's orally. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations at 45
C.F.R. § 46.117 require, however, that the elements of legally effective Infonned Consent
(specified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1992» be embodied in the written Infonned Consent Document.
124. The special care that, I believe, must be given to the infonned consent process whenever
the research-therapy distinction, see supra text accompanying footnotes 19·34, is in danger of
being compromised, is illustrated by a comment made by my respected colleague and friend
Robert J. Levine who read an earlier draft of this paper:
My perception of the investigators' motivation continues to be very different from
yours. I see this as an instance of opportunistic research. The physician-investigators did
not expose subjects to the risks of withdrawal from medication in order to do research.
Rather, in the light of their reading of the results of observations published by others, they
decided that it would be in the medical interests of these patients to have their medications
withdrawn. Although they knew that some of them would develop symptoms, they could
not predict which. What they planned to do was to keep a careful record of their
observations of those who developed symptoms. They further made plans to remove
patients from the study and treat them if certain specific criteria were met.
Letter from Robert J. Levine to Jay Katz (Sept. 24, 1993) (quoted by permission). Viewing the
"motivation" of the investigators as "opportunistic research" in the service of the "medical
interests of these patients" co-joins therapy and research. In the UCLA study the patient-subjects'
medical interests were subordinated to the inflexibility of the research design. See supra text
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After complaints about the study had come to OPRR's attention125 and
it had discussed the problem with UCLA, a letter from OPRR detailed "the
agreed-upon actions" which UCLA would now take:
[P]rovide (a) more detailed information regarding the risks associated with
lengthy withdrawal of antipsychotic medication, including information
regarding the likely rates of exacerbation or relapse and the consequences
thereof; (b) an indication that, in the event of such exacerbation or relapse, it
is likely that antipsychotic medication will need to be resumed; (c) a
description of the risks associated with continued fixed dose medication
treatment; and (d) a disclosure of alternative courses of treatment ... :26
The Continuing Care Brochure will be modified to ensure that it accurately
reflects the parameters of the After Care Program's research protocols. 127
In addition, OPRR required the following additional actions:
(I) No new subjects should be enrolled in this research until the revised
Informed Consent Documents have been reviewed and approved by the UCLA
accompanying notes 56-59. It is this fact that needed to be highlighted in the consent fonn,
notwithstanding any accompanying therapeutic motivations of the investigators. Viewing research
also as treatment, see supra text accompanying footnotes 28-34, invites confusion in the minds
of all participants as to who they are: physicians or investigators, patients or subjects. In turn,
it makes it easier for investigators to take license because of their "benevolent therapeutic
intentions." Furthennore, the "specific criteria [for removal from the study]" noted by Levine
included relapse to the severest level of psychosis, an unacceptable criterion for clinical practice.
Long before that point is reached psychiatrists would urge their patients to resume taking
medication. Thus, I would argue that the physician-investigators' conduct was motivated by their
research interest, even though they might eventually also bestow benefits on their subjects or
future patients. If I am correct, then the patient-subjects' medical interests are in this instance
different from, and should not be conflated with, the investigators' research interests.
125. The complaint was lodged by Bob and Gloria Aller, parents of one of the subjects. The
story of Greg's participation in, and gradual deterioration during, the study is graphically
described in a recent article: Eventually, he not only dropped out of college, but also
took out a carving knife, walked to the door of his mother's kitchen, [and thinking that]
"my mom was possessed by the devil," ... "[m]y plan was to scare the devil out of her
literally." The Allers began barricading their bedroom door at night. [A few days later]
he moved out, [and when he saw Nuechterlein's partner, Dr. Michael Gitlin, Greg kept
this infonnation from him, and thus Gitlin] noted "Moved out from parents. Says no
symptoms present. Finishing the semester,"
James Willwerth, Tinkering with Madness, 42 TIME 41-42 (Aug. 3D, 1992). It took five more
months, and the article describes what happened during that interval, before he was remedicated
at UCLA. Id.
126. Letter from J. Thomas Puglisi, Acting Chief, Compliance Oversight Branch of the Office
for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) to Richard Sisson, Senior Vice Chancellor of
Academic Affairs at the University of California Los Angeles 1 (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with
author).
127. Id. at 2.
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Institutional Review Board (IRB).
(2) The revised IRB-approved Informed Consent Documents should be
used to obtain renewed consent from all subjects currently participating in this
research, including subjects for whom clinical monitoring constitutes the only
research involvement.
(3) Copies of the revised IRB-approved Informed Consent Documents and
of the revised Continuing Care Brochure should be forwarded to OPRR as
soon as possible.
(4) UCLA should consider, and OPRR strongly recommends, contacting
former research subjects in writing to provide them with the additional
information included in the revised Informed Consent Documents. Copies of
such communications with former subjects should be forwarded to OPRR as
soon as they become available. l28
OPRR did not insist that UCLA stop the research project immediately, or at
least, that the patient-subjects be examined by independent psychiatrists in
order to assess their individual treatment needs. In light of what already had
transpired, such an opportunity would have made it easier for patient-subjects
to decide whether they wished to continue in, or withdraw from, the study.
Moreover, in light of the serious deficiencies in the informed consent
form,I29 which is one of the prime responsibilities of IRBs to review,130
OPRR did not institute a thorough investigation of the practices of UCLA's
IRB. OPRR's evaluation was sufficiently critical of the IRB process to
suggest that the IRB's review of other research proposals may be similarly
ftawed. 131 Undertaking such an investigation was even more pressing in this
case since several subject-patients suffered severe schizophrenic relapses,132
and one young man allegedly committed suicide.133
128. Id.
129. Even after modifying the consent forms initially used, UCLA continues to deny any
wrongdoing and contends that the forms and process used to obtain initial consent were
appropriate. See Letter from Richard Sisson, Senior Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs at the
University of California Los Angeles to J. Thomas Puglisi, Acting Chief, Compliance Oversight
Branch of the OPRR 4-5 (Sept. 17, 1992) (on file with author).
130. Federal Regulations instruct IRBs to "determine that all of the following requirements
are satisfied: ... (4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject ... in
accordance with, and to the extent required by § 46.117." 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(4) (1992).
131. The copy of the letter from OPRR to UCLA, made available to me through the Freedom
of Information Act, excluded three paragraphs. They may have contained additional criticisms
of UCLA's conduct in this case. See supra note 126.
132. Subotnik & Nuechterlein, supra note 102.
133. One participant in the UCLA project committed suicide on March 28, 1992, after being
taken off psychotropic medication. Sandy Rovner, Ethics Concerns Raised in Schizophrenia
Study, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at H7. The Federal Regulations require that "[w]here
appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring the data collected to
insure the safety of subjects." 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(6) (1992). The protocol, however, did not
describe in sufficient detail the special monitoring that would be provided, even though some of
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The revised informed consent form, while an improvement over the
previous one, continues to leave patient-subjects uninformed, inter alia, about
the specific severity of relapse which they might suffer, mentioning only
"difficulties in relationship with others and problems with work or school"; or
what specific "psychotic symptoms or severe symptoms" will lead to providing
medication once again. It does not present in any meaningful detail the
advantages and disadvantages of participating in the study or receiving
customary treatment for their condition. The consent form did not state with
sufficient clarity that the primary objective of the study was to conduct
research for the sake of future patients, perhaps of benefit to those enrolled in
this study in the future, and that it was not therapy for the subject's individual
present needs. While the consent form now admits that "70-80% of patients
who have entered this study in the past have experienced a psychotic
exacerbation or relapse within one year" and that "I may become worse during
the study," it says nothing about what subjects specifically should consider,
and reflect on, before exposing themselves to these risks. On the other hand,
with respect to benefits it is noted that withdrawal of medication will keep
them from "developing tardive dyskinesia which involves abnormal movements
of the face, hands, legs or trunk." And the form goes on to emphasize, ,"I may
benefit from this study by being taken off medication in a careful way while
under close medical supervision."134 The risks deserved at least similar
detailed explication and prominence.
What transpired in this study is not unique to UCLA; it is symptomatic of
the flawed nature of current regulations and current practices protecting the
human rights of research subjects. These flaws, as I have argued throughout
this article, extend from the Federal Regulations themseives13S to the
supervision of projects by IRBs and OPRR. Thus, my analysis of UCLA's
consent form should not be taken merely as a critique of the nature and depth
the research subjects could suffer a severe relapse. The protocol only stated that "a member of
the clinic staff will meet regularly as needed" with the patient. See supra note 102.
134. Keith Nuechterlein, Informed Consent Agreement for Patients: Double-Blind Drug
Crossover and Withdrawal Project 3 (Sept. 1992) (on file with author).
135. Shamoo and Irving recently noted that recommendations by various Federal Commissions
to consider persons with mental illness as members of a vulnerable group who deserve special
protection whenever they participate in research were not implemented. They learned that "[this]
outcome was the result in large part of opposition from researchers on mental disorders who
claimed that the population in question were no more vulnerable than most persons with severe
medical disorders and that the suggested limitations would seriously restrict research on mental
disorders." Shamoo and Irving concluded that "the issue of using persons with mental illness as
human research subjects has been lost in the shuffle, due in part to the lobbying effort of some
researchers on mental disorders." They also raise the important question, "what was the
justification for delegating to local IRBs the essential responsibilities for affording protections for
persons with mental illness ... ?" Adil E. Shamoo & Dianne N. Irving, Accountability in
Research Using Persons With Menta/Illness 1,2 (1994) (forthcoming article, on file with author).
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of the infonnation that was or was not included in the written document, but,
more importantly, as a critique of the entire infonned consent process. The
problems with this study, as with many others, are: (1) subject-patients'
consent was manipulated; (2) trivial and non-trivial risks were insufficiently
distinguished; (3) the severity of predictable risks was not highlighted nor was
the incidence of their likelihood disclosed; and (4) the risks and benefits of
non-participation were neither sufficiently disclosed- nor satisfactorily
discussed. Under these circumstances, patient-subjects were not offered a
meaningful choice whether or not to participate in the study.136
IX. CONCLUSION
The history of experimentation with human beings testifies to physician-
scientists' real and caring dedication to the alleviation of mankind's pain and
suffering from the ravages of disease. It also testifies to the carelessness with
which human beings have been recruited for participation in research, a
carelessness that has been too readily obscured by the caring dimension of
scientists' work. My colleague, the late Robert Cover, when writing about
judicial sentencing reminded us that "judges deal pain and death."137 He
went on to say that "persons [he meant judges but he could have said the same
about physician-scientists as well] act within social organizations that exercise
authority violently without experiencing ... the nonnal degree or inhibition
which regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously.,,138 .
If infonned consent is to fulfill its promise of protecting the rights of
research subjects to autonomy and self-determination, we must ponder Hans
Jonas' challenge:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not an uncompromising
commitment. [A] slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten
society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore that their particular
disease be not yet conquered, but that society would indeed be threatened by
the erosion of those moral values whose loss possibly caused by too ruthless
a pursuit of scientific progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not
worth having.139
Jonas is concerned about the erosion of medicine's .and society's moral
integrity resulting from violations of the dignity of research subjects.
Some advances in medicine might have been slower in coming had
physician-investigators pursued their clinical research less aggressively by not
engineering consent. Would delay have been a price worth paying, even
136. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
137. Robert Cover. Violence and the Word. 95 YALE L.J. 1609 (1986).
138. Id. at 1615.
139. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98
DAEDALUS 219. 245 (1969).
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though the suffering of future patients might have remained for a while longer
without relief? Or is medical progress not an optional goal but one to which
individual autonomy and self-determination must yield? Answers to these
questions ultimately depend on one's vision of the future and the price our
generation is willing to pay for the sake of medical progress at the expense of
respect for the persons who are asked to make progress possible.
While in this article my personal views on these questions clearly emerge,
my purpose in writing it has been less to advocate their implementation and
more to draw attention to the fact that in the pursuit of scientific progress we
have largely paid lip service to the subjects' rights to be fully informed. In
setting forth the nature and quality of the conversations between physician-
investigators and their patient-subjects, I wanted to highlight the wide chasm
that separates contemporary rhetoric from practices in implementing human
subjects' rights to make their own decisions about serving as means for others'
ends.
In juxtaposing in the title of this article human rights and human
experimentation, I appreciate that the contours of such rights are still ill-
defined. The idea that human beings possess rights to inviolate dignity is of
recent origin and in need of more precise construction and surely in need of
a deeper commitment. However, it is an idea that since World War II has
begun to capture the imagination of the world community, as attested by the
many United Nations' resolutions on human rights. l40
It is also an idea, in language of constitutional rights, that has captured the
imagination of some of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. In
1987, the Court was faced with the question of whether the constitutional
rights of James Stanley, an army serviceman, were violated when in 1958,
without his knowledge, LSD was administered to him in an army experiment
to study the effects of this drug on human beings. 141 Stanley had sued the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court split five to four,
and Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded in a highly technical
opinion that to allow Stanley to sue the army successfully would be a judicial
intrusion upon military matters that "would call into question military
discipline and decision making."142 Justices O'Connor and Brennan wrote
separate dissenting opinions, joined by Justice Marshall and, in part, by Justice
Stevens. Justice Brennan began by arguing that the Court was wrong in
holding
that the Constitution provides him with no remedy, solely because his injuries
were inflicted while he performed his duties in the Nation's Armed Forces.
140. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
141. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). For a more extended discussion of
Stanley, see George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency,
in THE NAZI DocroRS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 212-15.
142. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682.
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If our Constitution required this result, the Court's decision, though legally
necessary, would expose a tragic flaw in that document. But in reality, the
Court disregards the commands of our Constitution, and bows instead to the
purported requirements of a different master, military discipline, declining to
provide Stanley with a remedy because it finds "special factors counselling
hesitation."143
He concluded his opinion with these words:
The subject of experimentation who has not volunteered is treated as an object,
a sample. James Stanley will receive no compensation for this indignity. A
test providing absolute immunity for intentional constitutional torts only when
such immunity was essential to maintenance of military discipline would "take
into account the special importance of defending our Nation without
completely abandoning the freedoms that make it worth defending." But
absent a showing that military discipline is concretely (not abstractly)
implicated by Stanley's action, its talismanic invocation does not counsel
hesitation in the face of an intentional constitutional tort, such as the
Government's experimentation on an unknowing human subject. Soldiers
ought not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to their essential human
dignity.144
In a different context, my former colleague Charles L. Black, Jr. has
eloquently advanced the proposition that our Constitution guarantees United
States citizens universal human rights which can be asserted against the fifty
local state governments. He found such guarantees in the Declaration of
Independence, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunity Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 145 What particularly caught my eye were the
concluding paragraphs of his article:
I want to add a word about the intentions and hopes that have guided the
writing of this paper. First of all, it has seemed not to be generally understood
that an amply developed human-rights system, good against the States, is
absolutely essential to the moral unity and integrity of the whole nation. This
is a thing so obvious that one ought not to have to write about it at all. But
much exposure to public discourse has brought home to me that it does need
to be written about. As many citizens as possible should be brought to realize
that without such a corpus of national human rights law good against the
States, we ought to stop saying, "One nation indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all," and speak instead of, "One nation divisible and divided into
fifty zones of political morality, with liberty and justice in such kind and
measure as these good things may from time to time be granted by these fifty
143. Id. at 686.
144. Id. at 708 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530-532 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting».
145. Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible"; Unnamed Human Rights in the States.
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 17,25 (1991).
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political subdivisions."I46
The time may eventually come when violations of human rights, as in
Stanley, will be afforded constitutional protection. Perhaps the recent
revelations about radiation experiments conducted during the 1940s and 1950s
with retarded boys, newborn infants, pregnant women, prisoners and
hospitalized patients, more often than not without full disclosure and
consent,141 will lead to regulations of research which comport better with the
human rights of subjects of research. This will only happen, however, if it is
recognized that safeguarding such rights requires not only protection from
physical harm but also, and equally important, a commitment to using human
beings as means for our ends only with their voluntary consent.148 Justice
O'Connor put it well in Stanley: "I am prepared to say that our Constitution's
promise of due process of law guarantees this much.,,149 The dissenting
Justices in Stanley and Charles Black point medicine in the right direction. In
writing this article I wanted to add my voice to theirs by arguing that the
caring dimension of medicine also requires taking most seriously the idea that
research subjects possess human rights that are inviolate.
146. Id. at 55.
147. See Gary Lee, U.S. Should Pay Victims. O'Leary Says 800 Were Deliberately Exposed
to Radiation, Energy ChiefReveals, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,1993, at AI; Melissa Healy, Payments
Urged for Radiation Test Victims, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 29,1993, at AI; David Armstrong, State
Expects Further 1940s-50s Revelations, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1993, at § 3, p.l; Associated
Press, Irradiated Deserve Aid, Energy Says, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 1993, at 1.
148. Any new Presidential Commission or Ethics Advisory Board should also have the
authority to formulate research policies that seek to resolve the inevitable tensions between the
inviolability of subjects of research and the claims of science and society to advance knowledge.
Such a Board's proposed policies should then be subjected to a relentless public debate and
eventually approved by Congress. See supra notes 90-10 I and accompanying text. Equally
important, since biomedical research will continue to open up new frontiers in its quest to advance
science, will be the Board's responsibility to promulgate guidelines for the conduct of research
to which IRBs must adhere. Finally, such a Board should probably not be located within the
Department of Health and Human Services. If it is, its relationship to, and independence from,
the Department should be clearly specified. My major contention is this: The moral tensions
inherent in human research have been debated at length. We do not need a Board that provides
only advice but one that will resolve these tensions as best it can and with continuing authority
to do so as we come face to face with new moral dilemmas in the conduct of human research.
149. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 710.
